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mardi, 09 décembre 2014

La Resolución delirante del Congreso de EE.UU. se interpreta como una declaración de guerra a Rusia

Ex: http://elespiadigital.com

El excongresista estadounidense Ron Paul considera que la nueva resolución adoptada por el Congreso de EE.UU. son "16 páginas de propaganda" contra Rusia y puede acarrear graves consecuencias, incluida la guerra.

La resolución 758 adoptada por el Congreso de EE.UU. es "uno de los peores documentos legislativos de la historia", opina el exmiembro del Congreso Ron Paul en un artículo que ha publicado en su página de Facebook. En el texto, titulado 'El Congreso temerario declara la guerra a Rusia', el político califica la nueva resolución del legislativo estadounidense de "propaganda de guerra en 16 páginas" y pone en evidencia el carácter infundado de cada una de las acusaciones contra Rusia.

En primer lugar, Paul señala que la resolución acusa "sin ningún fundamento" a Moscú de haber invadido Ucrania y condena la "violación de la soberanía ucraniana" por parte de Rusia. Pero si fuera verdad, replica el político, ¿por qué no existen videos ni imágenes que lo demuestren con todos los satélites sofisticados de EE.UU.? Paul prosigue con otra pregunta lógica: "¿Por qué no es una violación de la soberanía ucraniana cuando EE.UU. participa en el derrocamiento del gobierno elegido de este país como hizo en febrero?"

Según Paul, la resolución acusa a la gente del este de Ucrania de haber realizado "elecciones ilegales y fraudulentas" en noviembre. "¿Por qué cada vez que las elecciones no producen los resultados deseados por el Gobierno estadounidense se llaman "ilegales" y "fraudulentas"?", replica el excongresista. "¿Es que a la gente del este de Ucrania no se le permite la autodeterminación? ¿No es un derecho humano básico?".

Asimismo, la resolución constata que el avión de Malaysia Airlines que se estrelló sobre suelo ucraniano en julio fue derribado por un misil "lanzado por fuerzas separatistas apoyadas por Rusia en el este de Ucrania", a pesar de que en el informe preliminar las causas de la tragedia aún no fueron establecidas. El informe final no se publicará hasta el año siguiente.

La resolución también afirma que Rusia invadió Georgia en 2008, cuando incluso la Unión Europea, recuerda Paul, tras realizar una investigación "llegó a la conclusión de que fue Tbilisi el que empezó una guerra injustificada contra Rusia y no al revés".

Una de las ideas más peligrosas, según Paul, es que la resolución da la luz verde al presidente ucraniano Piotr Poroshenko para volver a iniciar ataques militares contra las provincias favorables a la independencia, insistiendo en "el desarme de los separatistas y fuerzas paramilitares en el este de Ucrania". Para conseguirlo, la resolución directamente implica al Gobierno estadounidense en el conflicto pidiendo al presidente que "proporcione al Gobierno de Ucrania elementos de defensa letales y no letales, así como servicios y entrenamiento necesario para defender de forma eficaz su territorio y soberanía".

La nueva resolución del Congreso fue aprobada el pasado 4 de diciembre con solo 10 votos en contra.

Los medios de EE.UU. silencian la resolución aprobada contra Rusia

El economista Michel Chossudovsky, fundador del Centro para la Investigación de la Globalización Global Research, denuncia que la aprobación de la resolución de la Cámara de Representantes de EE.UU. contra Rusia se silencia en los medios. "Puedo decir que casi nadie sabe de esta resolución y había un acuerdo previo con la prensa estadounidense y europea para no comentarla, ni siquiera informar al público de que había sido adoptada", reveló el académico canadiense a RT.

A su juicio,  tanta desinformación en EE.UU. no es algo nuevo, sino "algo que ya existe desde hace mucho tiempo".

Chossudovsky opina que si "el público estadounidense estuviese informado de lo que realmente sucede tanto en Oriente Medio como en la frontera con Rusia, habría convocado un movimiento de protesta de envergadura, un movimiento antiguerra".

El economista tacha la resolución de "tremendamente impactante", ya que "en cierta manera da la luz verde al presidente de EE.UU. para declarar la guerra a Rusia".

Putin ha dado una señal clara a los políticos de Occidente

En su mensaje anual a la Asamblea Federal el presidente Vladímir Putin ha dejado claro que Rusia no a cambiará su posición respecto a Ucrania pese a las presiones. Algunos expertos, como Vladímir Olenchenko, perciben un aviso claro a Occidente.

En su discurso ante la Asamblea Federal, el presidente ruso advirtió que, a pesar de la presión, Rusia nunca seguirá el camino del autoaislamiento ni buscará a enemigos, pero enfatizó que "hablar con Rusia utilizando el lenguaje de la fuerza no tiene ningún sentido".

"Es una especie de señal o estímulo para aquellos que se adhieren al sentido común en la política. Hay que entender claramente que cuando nos referimos al régimen de sanciones ello no quiere decir que la población de los países que imponen esas sanciones esté plenamente de acuerdo y se solidarice con tales medidas. No es así. Por ejemplo, en Alemania las encuestas de opinión pública indican que los alemanes no comparten las sanciones [contra Rusia]", explicó a la radio 'Sputnik' el abogado y representante del Centro de Estudios Europeos Vladímir Olenchenko, citado por RIA Novosti.

Además, Olenchenko recordó que contra las sanciones no solo se manifiestan empresas alemanas, sino que entre los líderes germanos tampoco hay unanimidad sobre esta cuestión. "Algunos políticos subrayan la importancia de pasar al lenguaje de diálogo y, en un sentido más amplio, señalan que es necesario encontrar maneras de salir del régimen de sanciones", recordó Olenchenko.

A juicio del experto, la situación es más o menos semejante en otros países de la UE. "Alemania es un país líder en Europa y lo que está sucediendo en este país muestra claramente lo que sucede en otros países de la Unión Europea", aseguró.

Por qué EE.UU. quiere desintegrar Europa en microestados

Olenchenko también hizo hincapié en las palabras de Putin respecto a que es imposible que en Rusia se dé un "escenario yugoslavo de desintegración". Este jueves el mandatario ruso indicó que en Occidente "querían desintegrar Rusia como hicieron con Yugoslavia". "Fracasaron porque los detuvimos", aseveró. 

El experto respalda al presidente y explica: "Uno de los escenarios era reducir el tamaño de los estados y su fragmentación en otros más pequeños. Por supuesto es más fácil presionar a los países pequeños de Europa: es más fácil ofrecerles propuestas. Si lo tomamos en un sentido más amplio, ello quiere decir que es más fácil promover sus intereses y políticas. Este es uno de los enfoques principales de los EE.UU. y ha habido intentos de aplicar esto a Rusia".

jeudi, 31 juillet 2014

La seconda guerra fredda

 

2014-06-29-1.jpg

 

Rivista di studi Geopolitici

 

2° trimestre 2014

 

La seconda guerra fredda

 

 

IMPORRE LA CULTURA EUROPEA AGLI EUROPEI
di Ivan Buttignon


Venezia Giulia, 1945-1954. Il fantomatico Territorio Libero di Trieste è diviso tra Zona A, occupata dai britannici e dagli statunitensi, e la Zona B, dagli jugoslavi. Specificamente nella prima, l’impronta alleata s’imprime in tutto il suo senso politico ma soprattutto culturale: Trieste deve diventare democratica, occidentale, europea; con le buone o con le cattive. La Venezia Giulia, o meglio quella piccola quota del territorio giuliano rimasta nell’area occidentale, rifiuta di venire standardizzato dalla logica anglo-americana e di diventarne serva. Il saggio insiste sulle trame sia politiche che, a maggior ragione, culturali che incombono sulla Zona A in termini di contrapposizione tra un governo alleato che specula sulle difficoltà di riorganizzazione politica, economica e sociale, implementando ricette formalmente democratiche ma che de facto creano maggiori e più profonde disuguaglianze, e il cosiddetto fronte filoitaliano, stremato per la sempre più carente rappresentanza italiana sia nella Zona B, dove la situazione assume i tratti della persecuzione antitaliana, sia nella Zona A.

CRISI ECONOMICA EUROPEA E NUOVI MOVIMENTI SOCIALI
di Cristiano Procentese


La crisi finanziaria globale di questi ultimi anni è stata l’elemento scatenante di una serie di crisi economiche, sociali e politiche. Gli Stati europei insistono nell’adottare politiche improntate al libero mercato e, contemporaneamente, a smantellare gli investimenti nello stato sociale. Aumentano le disuguaglianze e la povertà e, come se non bastasse, le banche hanno ridotto i prestiti alle famiglie e alle imprese. Le popolazioni locali, costrette a sopportare sacrifici odiosi e iniqui, si sentono sempre più estranee alla politica tradizionale. Fortunatamente, sta emergendo nei cittadini europei un’esigenza di passare dalla centralità dei mercati alla priorità dei propri diritti. Nuove forme di associazionismo si vanno affermando, tuttavia tali nuovi gruppi, pur con tutto il loro attivismo, oltre ad essere privi di un mandato democratico, appaiono assai eterogenei per ambito di interesse e ancora lontani dall’idea di democrazia partecipativa.

LE DIFFICILI RELAZIONI USA-PAKISTAN
di Silvia Bettiol


Le relazioni tra il Pakistan e gli Stati Uniti sono iniziate durante la guerra fredda, quando i due Paesi si sono alleati per sconfiggere i sovietici in Afghanistan. Dopo l’11 settembre del 2001 tuttavia i due Stati non possono più essere considerati alleati. Gli interessi nazionali pakistani e quelli statunitensi si scontrano continuamente, rendendo difficili le relazioni tra Washington e Islamabad che, nonostante le divergenze, sono oggi costretti a collaborare per cercare di gestire ciò che hanno involontariamente creato con le loro decisioni durante gli anni Ottanta.

RECENSIONE di: Giulietto Chiesa, Invece della catastrofe (a cura di Renato Pallavidini)

 

vendredi, 11 juillet 2014

La seconda guerra fredda

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LA SECONDA GUERRA FREDDA

Claudio Mutti

Ex: http://www.eurasia-rivista.org

“Guerra fredda” è la formula giornalistica che diventò d’uso corrente nel 1948, con l’inizio del blocco di Berlino, per definire lo stato di guerra non guerreggiata, ovvero di pace armata, fra i due grandi blocchi antagonisti e simultaneamente solidali nella spartizione del potere mondiale: il blocco occidentale facente capo agli USA e quello eurasiatico facente capo all’URSS. Pare che la fortuna di tale termine, impiegato per indicare un’intera fase storica, sia dovuta, se non a George Orwell che lo coniò, al giornalista statunitense Walter Lippmann, il quale lo diffuse tramite una serie di articoli pubblicati nel luglio 1947 sul “New York Herald Tribune” e poi raccolti nel volume The Cold War. A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy.

L’atto ufficiale di nascita della Guerra fredda può essere individuato nel discorso pronunciato il 5 marzo 1946 a Fulton (Missouri) da Sir Winston Churchill, che in quella circostanza usò per la prima volta un’altra espressione destinata ad incontrare analogo successo: “cortina di ferro”.

Caratterizzata da continui atti ostili, la guerra fredda fu combattuta con un’intensa attività propagandistica affidata alla stampa ed alle emittenti radiofoniche (“guerra delle onde”) e con la divulgazione di notizie ora incoraggianti ora deprimenti (“guerra dei nervi”).

Iniziata nello scenario successivo alla seconda guerra mondiale e finita nel 1989-1991, la guerra fredda può essere considerata, se è lecito continuare ad usare il termine “guerra” in maniera estensiva, una terza guerra mondiale. Se non altro, l’uso arbitrario del termine può servire a rappresentare la realtà di un conflitto che è terminato con la vittoria di un antagonista e la sconfitta dell’altro. Come sostiene Brzezinski, “siccome la guerra fredda è stata vinta pacificamente, sia i vincitori sia i vinti hanno condiviso l’interesse a nascondere il fatto che essa è terminata con una vittoria ed a mascherare sotto le parvenze di una riconciliazione tra Est ed Ovest quella che è stata una vittoria geopolitica e ideologica dell’Occidente”(1).

Infatti la guerra fredda o terza guerra mondiale “è stata un novum della storia, non tanto perché in passato non siano state condotte guerre in cui l’elemento religioso e l’elemento economico-territoriale non fossero già presenti (…) quanto perché siamo qui di fronte ad un intreccio fra elemento geopolitico (il confronto USA-URSS) ed elemento ideologico (il confronto fra capitalismo e comunismo) talmente potente ed invasivo da non tollerare vere e proprie analogie con eventi del passato”(2).

Nella fase attuale dei rapporti tra il blocco occidentale e la Russia, fase inaugurata dal putsch di Kiev sostenuto dall’Occidente, l’intreccio dell’elemento geopolitico con quello ideologico non è certamente così stretto come nel periodo della (prima) guerra fredda. La stessa formula di “guerra fredda”, secondo quanto ha dichiarato il 26 marzo 2014 Barack Obama, non sarebbe riproponibile, proprio per il fatto che, “a differenza dell’URSS, la Russia non guida un blocco di nazioni o un’ideologia globale”(3).

Va però osservato che il medesimo Obama, contraddicendosi in parte, ha tuttavia attribuito alla Russia postsovietica una visione ideologica, la quale sosterrebbe “che gli uomini e le donne comuni siano di vedute troppo corte per poter badare ai propri affari, e che ordine e progresso possano esserci soltanto quando i singoli rinunciano ai propri diritti a vantaggio di una potente sovranità collettiva”.

Per quanto riguarda il blocco occidentale, il presidente statunitense ha ribadito in maniera chiarissima la connessione tra l’aspetto geopolitico e quello ideologico. “Da un lato all’altro dell’Atlantico – egli ha detto – abbiamo abbracciato una visione condivisa di Europa; una visione che si basa sulla democrazia rappresentativa, i diritti dell’individuo, e il principio che le nazioni possano soddisfare gli interessi dei loro cittadini con il commercio e il libero mercato; una rete di sicurezza sociale e il rispetto per chi professa una religione diversa o ha origini diverse”. O caratteri antropologici diversi, come nel caso dei “nostri fratelli gay e [del]le nostre sorelle lesbiche”.

Obama non ha mancato di proclamare la validità universale di quelli che ha definito, parlando a nome dell’Occidente globale, “i nostri ideali”. “Gli ideali che ci uniscono – ha detto – hanno la medesima importanza per i giovani di Boston e di Bruxelles, di Giacarta e di Nairobi, di Cracovia e di Kiev”. E a proposito di Kiev ha dichiarato che “è proprio questa la posta in gioco oggi in Ucraina”: ossia l’imposizione degl’interessi geopolitici atlantici e della visione ideologica occidentale.

È vero che la radice della guerra fredda – intesa non come “un segmento di storia ma [come] una curvatura permanente della geopolitica contemporanea”(4) – è geopolitica prima che ideologica. Come dichiara in maniera franca e realistica il recente editoriale di una rivista di ispirazione occidentalista, “per l’America si tratta di garantirsi contro l’emergere di una potenza rivale in Eurasia. Poco importa se comunista, buddhista o vegana”(5).

Resta tuttavia il fatto che, se la Russia ha una sua visione geopolitica, essa non dispone però di una sua ideologia da contrapporre a quella occidentale. Eppure, come reclama Aleksandr Dugin, “la Russia, intesa come civiltà, non può, ma deve avere valori propri, diversi da quelli delle altre civiltà”.

L’esigenza di richiamarsi ai princìpi ispiratori della propria civiltà non riguarda soltanto la Russia, ma tutte le aree in cui si articola il continente eurasiatico e quindi tutte quelle forze che condividono la prospettiva di un’Eurasia sovrana. Gábor Vona ha espresso chiaramente tale esigenza: “Non ci può bastare – afferma il politico ungherese – un’alternativa semplicemente geografica e geopolitica, ma avvertiamo la necessità di un eurasiatismo spirituale. Se non siamo in grado di assicurarlo, allora la nostra visione rimane soltanto una diversa concezione politica, economica, militare o amministrativa, capace sì di rappresentare una diversità strutturale, ma non una rottura di livello qualitativa di fronte alla globalizzazione occidentale. Ci sarà un polo politico opposto, ma non una superiorità qualitativa. Tutto ciò può creare le basi per una nuova guerra fredda o mondiale, nella quale si affronteranno due forze antitradizionali, come è avvenuto nel caso dell’URSS e degli USA, ma certamente non sarà possibile contrastare il processo storico della diffusione dell’antitradizione. Per noi invece sarebbe proprio questo l’essenziale. Dal nostro punto di vista, è inconcepibile uno scontro in cui una globalizzazione si contrapponga ad un’altra globalizzazione”(6).

Claudio Mutti è Direttore di “Eurasia”.

NOTE

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for International Security, in The New Dimensions of International Security, “Adelphi Papers”, 265, inverno 1991-1992, p. 3.
2. Costanzo Preve, La quarta guerra mondiale, Edizioni all’insegna del Veltro, Parma 2008, p. 104.
3. Barack Obama, Usa ed Europa difenderanno il diritto, ma non è una nuova Guerra fredda, “La Stampa”, 27 marzo 2014, pp. 20-21.
4. Lo specchio ucraino, “Limes”, n. 4, aprile 2014, p. 18.
5. Lo specchio ucraino, cit., p. 17.
6. Vona Gábor, Néhány bevezető gondolat a szellemi eurázsianizmus megteremtéséhez, “Magyar Hüperión”, I, 3, nov. 2013 – genn. 2014, p. 294.

jeudi, 01 mai 2014

Notes sur le passé recomposé en narrative

Notes sur le passé recomposé en narrative

Ex: http://www.dedefensa.org

Parmi l’avalanche de nouvelles, d’initiatives, de montages, de false flag, de narrative qui caractérise la crise ukrainienne, on en distingue certaines qui conduisent à une hypothèse centrale. Le Système aux abois, dans le chef de l’américanisme et de la présidence BHO qui sont dans la même situation, jouent leur va-tout dans une tentative paradoxale de ressusciter le passé pour imposer définitivement “leur avenir” au monde. Il s’agit du tournant ultime, du quitte ou double, du tout au rien. La pièce ainsi montée, – comme l’on dit d’une “pièce montée” qui couronne un mariage, – est celle d’une “nouvelle Guerre froide” qui prend corps sous la forme d’articles divers, d’un rapport pour la Maison-Blanche, d’une fuite opportune vers le toujours-utile New York Times et ainsi de suite. La narrative prend forme. On croit revivre.

Il s’agit donc bien de cela : une deuxième Guerre froide, le futur par le retour vers le passé, le passé qui est le retour à la case-départ. L’occasion en est cette crise ukrainienne dont on ne finit pas de découvrir l’ampleur, l’extension, l’universalisation, – la crise ukrainienne, catastrophe en elle-même et catastrophique bouée de sauvetage pour une direction-Système des USA en perdition.

Parmi les diverses initiatives et mesures qui confortent cette hypothèse et l’interprétation que nous en offrons, nous en choisissons deux qui ont une puissante signification. L’une donne une appréciation générale de la conception générale en train de se mettre en place à Washington, l’autre une appréciation opérationnelle montrant un début d’application de cette appréciation ; mais, certes, si nous choisissions deux événements liés l’un à l’autre par une logique qui suggérerait une planification précise, une élaboration rationnelle, notre conviction est qu’il s’agit plutôt d’une agglomération de mesures et d’événements différents qui se sont imposés sans la moindre cohésion et, en fait, montrant que les événements dictent leur loi, plus que jamais. Pour mieux mettre en évidence ce constat fondamental, nous allons renverser l’ordre suggéré par la description que nous développons pour restituer la vraie chronologie qui est l’inverse que celle que nous suggérerait l’identification des deux événements.

La marionnette type-courroie de transmission

... Ainsi, le premier sujet abordé semblerait la conséquence du second qui suivra, mais il ne l’est pas. Il constitue un événement incontrôlé suscité par d’autres événements incontrôlés depuis la mise en action de la crise ukrainienne, amenant des réactions des directions politiques et directions-Système concernées pour le développement d’une nouvelle situation opérationnelle. Cette nouvelle situation opérationnelle, qu’on croirait enfantée par la “nouvelle conception générale en train de se mettre en place à Washington” (nous refusons de la baptiser “nouvelle stratégie” ou “nouvelle doctrine”, qui impliquerait une notion d’ordre et de logique, et de planification, qui est absolument et totalement absente du propos à son origine), se matérialise essentiellement par l’annonce de l’envoi de troupes US dans des pays bordant la Russie, évidemment présentées comme “défensives”. Il s’agit essentiellement de la Pologne et des pays baltes ; on comprend aussitôt, sans étonnement particulier, que c’est bien la Pologne qui joue un rôle fondamental dans ce bouleversement.

La nouvelle concerne donc l’envoi de troupes US en Pologne, – 10 000 hommes au minimum, voudraient les Polonais, 5 000 au plus selon la position de départ du Pentagone. On négocie... WSWS.org donne le 19 avril 2014 les détails des circonstances accompagnant le début de l’officialisation du déploiement des troupes US en Pologne, avec d’autres éléments militaires, par le biais des confidences sonores du ministre polonais de la défense visitant le Washington Post après une rencontre avec le secrétaire à la défense Chuck Hagel, – signes, tout cela, que la Pologne est de plus en plus la courroie de transmission, la “marionnette” mais aussi le partenaire actif et va-t’en-guerre des USA en Europe centrale.

«According to the Post, Polish Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak, visiting the newspaper after meeting with US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the Pentagon, said, “the decision has been made on a political level and that military planners are working out details.” The article continued: “There will also be intensified cooperation in air defense, special forces, cyberdefense and other areas. Poland will play a leading regional role, ‘under US patronage,’ he said.”

»The report makes clear that the US entered into the Geneva agreement with Russia, purportedly to “deescalate tensions” in Ukraine, in bad faith, intending to use Russia’s supposed breach of the deal as justification for expanded sanctions and a further aggressive buildup of US and NATO forces in Eastern Europe aimed at encircling and strangling Russia...»

La marionnette qui rugissait

Du côté polonais, les choses sont simples : c’est la fièvre de la guerre, avec l’affirmation furieuse de l’“ennemi russe”. Nous sommes à des années-lumière de la tentative de réconciliation Pologne-Russie du printemps 2010 (voir, par exemple, le 19 avril 2010). La Pologne est retombée dans la russophobie guerrière, en s’appuyant sur les USA dont elle estime qu’elle est en voie de devenir le “meilleur vassal” en Europe. La dialectique retrouve les accents des phases les plus agressives de l’histoire des relations entre la Pologne et la Russie. La Pologne veut évoluer vers une place privilégiée : bien que membre de l’OTAN et de l’UE, c’est d’abord en tant que “partenaire” bilatéral et interlocuteur européen privilégié des USA qu’elle veut traiter avec les USA.

Cette prétention, ce n’est pas rien. Elle risque autant d’irriter les partenaires européens de la Pologne, autant que de l’en éloigner dans certaines circonstances dont la plus aigue est évidemment d’une possibilité d’affrontement avec la Russie. (On verra ce qu’il restera, dans cette occurrence, du “Triangle de Weimar”, qui prétendait établir un lien de sécurité spécifique France-Allemagne-Pologne.) Les Allemands sont très loin d’être partisans d’un affrontement avec la Russie, comme l’a très récemment montré leur ministre des affaires étrangères suggérant que l’énergie dépensée à trouver de nouvelles sanctions contre la Russie serait mieux employée à chercher une véritable désescalade en Ukraine ; ils pourraient très vite s’impatienter, à mesure que cette position spécifique et bombastique de la Pologne s’affirmerait. Cela fait partie des tendances de divisions en Europe, entre Européens et entre l’Europe et les USA (voir le 14 avril 2014).

Le JCS et le “proconsul”

Du côté US, les choses ne sont pas plus simples et peut-être même sont-elles plus compliquées. Restons-en pour l’instant à la seule position du Pentagone, la Maison-Blanche et le département d’État ayant basculé dans le maximalisme compulsif irradiant de leurs conseillers d’influence venus de l’équipe neocons-R2P (voir le 22 avril 2014). Le Pentagone préférerait 5 000 soldats US en Pologne, et encore parce que le président demande des renforts, aux “10 000 hommes minimum” réclamés par les Polonais. La raison essentielle de cette pusillanimité est que le Pentagone ne dispose pas de réserves suffisantes, parce que les forces US sont déjà engagées partout, très diminuées, extrêmement limitées. L’autre “raison essentielle” (l’essentialité est élastique, par le temps qui courent et bondissent), c’est que le Pentagone ne se sent pas vraiment d’attaque pour tout faire pour défier les Russes et risquer une chose très, très sérieuse. On verra qui l’emportera lorsque le volume du contingent US en Pologne sera déterminé, et sous quelle forme.

Il y a déjà là un conflit interne qui se dessine. Les dernières péripéties, le silence des uns et les déclarations des autres, montrent qu’il s’agit d’un conflit des plus classiques, entre la maison-mère, le Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) et son président le général Dempsey au Pentagone d’une part, et d’autre part le général Breedlove, commandant en chef suprême en Europe (SACEUR) de la structure OTAN et chef du Central Command Europe (commandement national US). En temps de crise plus particulièrement, les relations entre la direction de Washington et le “proconsul” militaire US en Europe ont toujours été délicates. Le “proconsul” a tendance à soutenir les revendications des “vassaux européens” (la Pologne en l’occurrence, pour le cas qui nous occupe) tandis que le Pentagone défend ses intérêts généraux. (Un tel conflit a eu lieu à plusieurs reprises, notamment avec les SACEUR Goodpaster en 1973, Haig en 1976, Rogers en 1983, etc. Le dernier en date et l’un des plus fameux est celui des rapports exécrables entre le SACEUR, le général Wesley Clark, et le JCS de Washington lors de la guerre du Kosovo, cela menant jusqu’à une mise à pied à peine dissimulée de Clark en 2000.)

Le Pentagone sur les genoux

Ici, on mettra l’accent sur une situation qui se répercute sur toutes les crises, de diverses façons. A la différence de 1947-1948, à laquelle le document évoqué plus bas fait allusion comme référence d’une “nouvelle Guerre froide”, la situation de la puissance militaire US est aujourd’hui dans une situation radicalement différente. En 1947-1948, le budget du Pentagone, littéralement pulvérisé à partir de la victoire sur le Japon, était si bas que l’industrie aéronautique US dans sa quasi-entièreté était au bord de l’effondrement. (Certains jugent même, avec des arguments extrêmement convaincants, et une enquête minutieuse pour le cas invoqué, que la Guerre froide fut lancée du côté US à partir de ce qui fut en bonne partie un montage, pour sauver spécifiquement cette industrie à partir de commandes publiques massives et urgentes d’avions militaires. Voir notre texte du 12 février 2003 extrait de La Lettre d’analyse dd&e du 10 avril 1995, reprenant une analyse d’un livre de Frank Kofsky publié en 1994 sur cette affaire : Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation.)

Aujourd’hui, par contre, le budget du Pentagone est colossal : nominalement autour de $650 milliard, il dépasse en réalité les $1 000 milliards une fois prises en compte des dépenses affectées à d’autre poste (renseignement, énergie avec le développement nucléaire, etc.). Malgré cette monstruosité budgétaire, les capacités militaires US ne cessent de se réduire, au point où l’US Army est aujourd’hui quasiment au niveau des effectifs de 1940, alors au sommet de la politique isolationniste de désengagement (voir le 3 mars 2014). Une “mobilisation” pour une “nouvelle Guerre froide”, comme celle de 1948 pour la Guerre froide initiale, impliquerait, dans une bonne logique américaniste, un “réarmement”, c’est-à-dire une augmentation substantielle du budget militaire. Dans les conditions actuelles, une telle perspective est, successivement, extraordinairement et paradoxalement incertaine ; d’abord, par ses implications budgétaires catastrophiques alors que la dette menace l’équilibre du gouvernement US ; ensuite par les contraintes légales (“séquestration”) existantes pour au contraire réduire ce budget ; enfin, par l’incertitude où l’on se trouve concernant les capacités du Pentagone, empire du gaspillage et de la gestion catastrophique, de savoir si des augmentations conséquentes du budget ne conduiraient pas à un surcroît de gaspillage, de corruption et de gestion catastrophique, plutôt qu’à une augmentation des capacités. (La question est : les USA sont-ils encore capables de mobiliser, dans le vrai sens du mot ?) Les chefs du Pentagone, arcboutés sur leur puissance bureaucratique, devinent cela et ne sont pas nécessairement partisans d’une telle augmentation qui menacerait tout l’édifice, en même temps que le gouvernement US, pour une cause dont on a vu plus haut que ces chefs-là ne l’apprécient guère.

The Rest Of the World contre la Russie

Le deuxième point que nous voulons mentionner constitue l’essentiel en matière de communication. Il est exposé dans un article qui vient de paraître dans le New York Times, le 20 avril 2014, et c’est sans nul doute le plat de résistance. Il s’agit d’une nouvelle posture, – que d’aucuns qualifieront de “stratégie”, voire de “doctrine” s’ils en ont le goût, – de l’administration Obama vis-à-vis de la Russie. Nous parlons donc, comme on l’a signalé, d’une “nouvelle Guerre froide” basée sur les conceptions US de l’immédiat après-guerre, et précisément sur la stratégie du containment élaborée par George Kennan, qui occupait à cette époque le poste de la direction de la planification au département d’État. Le passage où cette référence est proposée se termine par une phrase explicitant l’opérationnalisation du concept, qui consiste à “isoler” la Russie du reste du monde ; l’aspect sidérant et surréaliste de cette opérationnalisation est que les USA se proposent de former une alliance générale quasiment du reste du monde contre la Russie, y compris la Chine, qu’entretemps le secrétaire à la défense Hagel est allé avertir de ne pas trop irriter le Japon au risque de voir les USA se dresser contre elle, quasi-opérationnellement (Eric Margolis, le 20 avril 2014 sur UNZ.com : «[Bismarck] would have been horrified to see Washington foolishly making enemies of Russia and China at the same time»)... Sans doute, même si cela ne nous est pas précisé, Obama compte-t-il convaincre également la Syrie, l’Iran, les autres BRICS, tous les pays qui se sont abstenus de voter à l'ONU pour la condamnation du référendum de Crimée (voir le 28 mars 2014), etc., de s’inscrire dans cette croisade internationale contre la Russie, où la Russie se retrouvera seule on vous l’assure.

«In effect, Mr. Obama is retrofitting for a new age the approach to Moscow that was first set out by the diplomat George F. Kennan in 1947 and that dominated American strategy through the fall of the Soviet Union. The administration’s priority is to hold together an international consensus against Russia, including even China, its longtime supporter on the United Nations Security Council.»

L’initiative de l’administration Obama est donc présentée comme une rupture fondamentale avec ce qui a précédé dans les relations des USA avec la Russie. Considérant, selon l’habituel penchant de la psychologie US pour l’inculpabilité (voir notamment le 26 mars 2014), que les USA ont tout fait pour “éduquer” la Russie, pour la rendre “civilisée”, et étant à ce point déçue par la fourberie de son élève, l’administration Obama décide d’une façon impériale mais qu’on devine pleine d’une immense sagesse qu’“assez c’est assez”. On écarte d’un geste négligent sinon nonchalant l’agacement ukrainien et l’on parle à l’échelle qui convient, qui est celle du monde cela va de soi... «Even as the crisis in Ukraine continues to defy easy resolution, President Obama and his national security team are looking beyond the immediate conflict to forge a new long-term approach to Russia that applies an updated version of the Cold War strategy of containment.

»Just as the United States resolved in the aftermath of World War II to counter the Soviet Union and its global ambitions, Mr. Obama is focused on isolating President Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia by cutting off its economic and political ties to the outside world, limiting its expansionist ambitions in its own neighborhood and effectively making it a pariah state. Mr. Obama has concluded that even if there is a resolution to the current standoff over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, he will never have a constructive relationship with Mr. Putin, aides said. As a result, Mr. Obama will spend his final two and a half years in office trying to minimize the disruption Mr. Putin can cause, preserve whatever marginal cooperation can be saved and otherwise ignore the master of the Kremlin in favor of other foreign policy areas where progress remains possible.

»“That is the strategy we ought to be pursuing,” said Ivo H. Daalder, formerly Mr. Obama’s ambassador to NATO and now president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “If you just stand there, be confident and raise the cost gradually and increasingly to Russia, that doesn’t solve your Crimea problem and it probably doesn’t solve your eastern Ukraine problem. But it may solve your Russia problem.”»

En attendant que cette “stratégie” soit mise en place et rende ses premiers effets, quelque part entre 2100 et 2200, le président Obama a décidé de se retirer sous sa tente et de ne plus songer aux manigances de Poutine, faisant ainsi comme s’il n’existait plus, Poutine, rien de moins, et le plongeant par conséquent dans un cruel embarras. Drapé dans sa dignité et dans sa puissance, Obama ignore désormais la Russie en attendant que celle-ci, complètement isolée, étranglée par sa propre infamie, privée de l’amicale camaraderie du reste du monde et du Système, tombe comme un fuit déjà blet. D’ici là, bien entendu, on vous l’assure sans souci de la contradiction interne du propos, la population russe, ayant compris où est son intérêt et où se trouve la vertu, aura renvoyé le tyran pourrir dans un Goulag quelconque.

«The prevailing view in the West Wing, though, is that while Mr. Putin seems for now to be enjoying the glow of success, he will eventually discover how much economic harm he has brought on his country. Mr. Obama’s aides noted the fall of the Russian stock market and the ruble, capital flight from the country and the increasing reluctance of foreign investors to expand that while American and European sanctions have not yet targeted wide parts of the Russian economy, they have sent a message to international businesses, and that just the threat of broader measures has produced a chilling effect. If the Russian economy suffers over the long term, senior American officials said, then Mr. Putin’s implicit compact with the Russian public promising growth for political control could be sundered.

»That may not happen quickly, however, and in the meantime, Mr. Obama seems intent on not letting Russia dominate his presidency. While Mr. Obama spends a lot of time on the Ukraine crisis, it does not seem to absorb him. Speaking privately with visitors, he is more likely to bring up topics like health care and the Republicans in Congress than Mr. Putin. Ukraine, he tells people, is not a major concern for most Americans, who are focused on the economy...»

 

Une tranquille schizophrénie

Ce texte est remarquable de schizophrénie tranquille développée sur le ton d’une élégante suffisance, dans sa description d’un monde enchanteur où le roi-Obama trône sur le “phare de la liberté” et sur l’“arsenal de la puissance et de la vertu”, acclamé par le reste du monde, – saut l’épouvantable Poutine, le cancre de la classe, le monstre quasi-hitlérien. La puissance de la transmutation de l’habituelle pompe américaniste en une sottise bombastique à prétention doctrinale et géopolitique est époustouflante. On retrouve, comme en une caricature, tous les travers de cette psychologie pervertie, son réductionnisme, son cloisonnement, son incapacité de tenir compte des relations de cause à effet ni même d’imaginer une telle chose, l’omniprésence étouffante de la suffisance américaniste, – tout cela transmutée en inculture, en ignorance, en préjugés.

Lorsqu’un Daalder énonce son jugement si sophistiqué («That is the strategy we ought to be pursuing. If you just stand there, be confident and raise the cost gradually and increasingly to Russia, that doesn’t solve your Crimea problem and it probably doesn’t solve your eastern Ukraine problem. But it may solve your Russia problem»), il pourrait aussi bien nous dire, avec sa maîtrise du tour sophistique transcrite en une analyse tranchante caractérisée par une complète idiotie, phénomène devenu à cet instant presque émouvant après tout, à force de conviction-Système : “Cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème du Pentagone et de notre dette qui nous écrase, cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème de la dissolution des USA, cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème du chaos que nous favorisons au Moyen-Orient, cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème du dollar qui prend eau de toutes parts, cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème de la catastrophe de l’environnement, cela ne résout peut-être pas le problème de la Fin des Temps, etc., mais cela pourrait résoudre le problème de la Russie...”

Trahison et inversion de la référence

Bien entendu, la nouvelle Guerre froide dont il est question dans cet article n’a rien à voir avec la “néo-Guerre froide” que nous définissions le 20 mars 2014. Ce n’est plus une néo-Guerre froide qu’imposeraient les événements mais une nouvelle Guerre froide “conçue et réalisée” par les équipes de communication de la Maison-Blanche, une “Guerre froide-narrative” si l'on veut. Pour autant, le lien est évident et l’on pourrait dire que la “Guerre froide-narrative” présentée comme une réaction extrêmement habile de la Maison-Blanche à la crise ukrainienne, constitue une sorte de “ce que je ne peux étouffer, je l’embrasse”.

Bien entendu, là s’arrête l’analogie faite par la Maison-Blanche avec la vraie Guerre froide qui nous est servie comme référence. Les conditions sont complètement différentes. Les USA ont une position relative extrêmement inférieure à celle qu’ils avaient en 1945 ; directement au niveau de leur puissance relative (les USA dominaient le monde ravagée par la guerre alors qu’eux-mêmes avaient au contraire développé exponentiellement leur puissance grâce à la guerre) ; indirectement au niveau de l’état de l’URSS dévastée par la guerre en 1945 (alors que la Russie est aujourd’hui en beaucoup plus forte position) et alors que leurs alliés européens et asiatiques, également dévastés, dépendaient complètement d’eux.

De même, les “stratégies” envisagées dans l’article cité ne correspondent pas aux schémas de la Guerre froide. L’idée de poursuivre les coopérations avec la Russie là où elles existent, tout en attaquant frontalement la Russie par divers moyens de pressions, d’influence, de sanctions, ne répond en rien au schéma de la Guerre froide, au contraire il le trahit. Cette idée, nommée durant la Guerre froide “de-linkage” (ne pas lier les différents dossiers entre eux, ce qui permet une mésentente ici et une coopération là) impliquait nécessairement une entente générale de principe USA-URSS, notamment au niveau de l’“équilibre de la terreur” (le nucléaire), c’est-à-dire l’absence d’hostilité directe, affichée et opérationnalisée par des mesures effectives. Ce n’est pas le cas dans la situation actuelle USA-Russie et dans la pseudo-“stratégie” envisagée.

Simulacre de crise

Il y a deux interprétations nécessaires à ce développement venu des USA concernant la crise ukrainienne, devenue brusquement dans le chef des USA la Grande Crise entre les USA et la Russie, – comme poursuite et conclusion finale et triomphale de la Guerre froide sous forme de “nouvelle Guerre froide”. Ces deux interprétations ne se contredisent en rien ni ne sont en rien exclusives l’une de l’autre ; elles se complètent, se renforcent, s’explicitent l’une l’autre. La première de ces interprétations est la plus intimiste et la plus objective, dans la mesure où elle conduit à analyser le comportement de la direction-Système de l’américanisme, et particulièrement de son représentant Obama, au travers des appréciations diverses qu’on lit dans le New York Times. Il s’agit d’une évaluation essentiellement psychologique et de communication, bien entendu autour d’une narrative...

On pourrait en effet conjecturer, avec nombre d’arguments dans ce sens, que ce document laisse transparaître une sorte de portrait d’Obama qui est en même temps une peinture de la psychologie-Système dominante à Washington. Bien évidemment, tout est bâti autour d’une posture quasi “impériale” du président des USA, trônant au bureau ovale et orientant la marche du monde à sa guise. Mais à force d’appuyer le trait on verse dans la caricature, qui devient dans ce cadre de l’influence du Système, une inversion complète.

Cette posture impériale, dans ce cas se situant elle-même “au-dessus de la mêlée” initiée évidemment et spécifiquement par le cancre de la classe (Poutine), entraîne le fait que le “message” devient effectivement inversion complète, et le détachement du maître totale irresponsabilité. A lire ces mots, – «...Mr. Obama seems intent on not letting Russia dominate his presidency. While Mr. Obama spends a lot of time on the Ukraine crisis, it does not seem to absorb him...», – on ne peut pas ne pas finir par conclure que le sujet de cette hagiographie, œuvre des “officiels” dispensant la bonne parole comme du NYT lui-même, présente comme une vertu le fait de se désintéresser du problème crisique central de notre temps d’effondrement, tout en laissant paraître un mépris extrême pour le “partenaire” de cet épisode fondamental. Au moins, pendant la Guerre froide, la vraie, les dirigeants US ne cachaient pas que l’absolue priorité de leur direction devait se concentrer sur les relations avec l’autre acteur stratégique nucléaire, en essayant au maximum de diffuser les tensions pouvant naître d’avatars de communication. Pour poursuivre l’analogie du “cancre de la classe” (Poutine) en la renversant, Obama apparaît comme un adolescent bouffie de vanité et de prétention, qui refuse l’essentiel de la tâche qu’il a prétendu accomplir parce qu’il n’est pas assuré d’y figurer à son complet avantage. Objectivement, cette inversion témoigne d’une effrayante schizophrénie qui laisse à penser sur ce que sera, – sur ce continuera à être en s’amplifiant, puisqu’il n’y a rien de nouveau à cet égard sinon l’outrance, les réactions des USA aux inévitables accidents, tensions imprévues, événements inattendus, etc., qui vont continuer à marquer la crise ukrainienne et tout ce qui se rapproche de près ou de loin de la dynamique de tension entre les USA et la Russie.

On comprend alors qu’il n’y a rien, dans le chef de Washington, ni d’une “stratégie” ni d’une “doctrine” là-dedans. Il s’agit de pure communication, autour d’une narrative sur laquelle l’American Century ne se couche jamais, comme l’on dit du soleil sur le fameux Empire qu’on sait, comme si la formule nietzschéenne de l’éternel retour avait trouvé son opérationnalité. On comprend, au-delà, que Washington n’est plus capable d’accoucher, ni d’une “stratégie”, ni d’une “doctrine”, que la projection sous forme de narrative hollywoodienne du film “The American Century, – le retour” suffit à entretenir sa conviction pathologique. La schizophrénie est complète, achevée, bouclée. Le président Barack Obama règne.

Accélération de la crise (suite)

Le précédent nous dit beaucoup de la crise à Washington, de la crise du pouvoir, de l’épuisement de la psychologie des principaux acteurs, mais pas grand’chose, certes, de la Grande Crise USA-Russie et de tout ce qui l’accompagne, et du flux dans laquelle elle se place, qui est l’épisode final de la crise d’effondrement du Système. Comme dirait le crétin couvert de privilèges-Système cité ci-dessus “cela ne résoudra pas le problème de la crise générale d’effondrement où les USA ont la place centrale mais cela résoudra le problème de l’identification de la schizophrénie à Washington”, – et nous voici devant la seconde interprétation nécessaire...

En déclenchant toute cette agitation, en exposant ces considérations qui prétendent au rang de “stratégie” ou à celui de “doctrine”, les spécialistes de la communication à Washington n’ont rien créé de spécifique ni de substantiel. On ne s’installe pas dans la crise en l’élargissant aux relations fondamentales entre les USA et la Russie comme le fait Washington pas simple manipulation, selon une simple démarche technique et bureaucratique dans le seul domaine de la communication. On s’installe dans une crise en paraissant l’élargir “aux relations fondamentales entre les USA et la Russie”, simplement parce que cette crise est déjà élargie à cette dimension. En ce sens, la démarche washingtonienne a son utilité, puisqu’elle nous montre qu’effectivement la crise ukrainienne a d’ores et déjà accouché d’une énorme crise entre les deux puissances nucléaires stratégiques, qui est aussi une énorme crise d’antagonisme culturel et conceptuel, une énorme crise s’inscrivant dans le cadre d’une crise de civilisation. On a à cet égard suffisamment d’indications et d’analyses pour nous permettre de conclure à cette stature imposante de la crise, et la “nouvelle Guerre froide” venue de Washington en est tout simplement, à la fois la confirmation et la conséquence, en même temps qu’une tentative maladroite d’une utilisation faussaire. Les stratèges en communication de Washington n’ont fait qu’acter un événement qui s’est fait lui-même, dont les causes et les effets dépassent largement leurs interprétations puisqu’il s’agit effectivement d’une opérationnalisation de la crise générale de notre civilisation. De ce point de vue, la “nouvelle Guerre froide” n’a vraiment rien à voir avec son faux modèle précédent, et au lieu d’une certaine complicité comme on en connut entre les USA et l’URSS de ce temps-là, on trouve au contraire tous les éléments de fécondation rapide de l’aggravation des relations.

Dans le même sens, la démarche washingtonienne a également son utilité, en nous montrant le comportement de Washington allant chercher sa référence dans un passé spécifique, extrêmement bien identifié, et qui a une très grande signification symbolique et de puissance pour les USA. Ce rappel, c’est une incantation à la “résurrection” d’une époque où les USA, alors avec une réputation sans tâche pour les parties du monde au-delà des océans, dominaient le monde d’une façon écrasante, incontestable, extraordinaire, – presque divine et dans tous les cas immensément vertueuse. Alors que les échos sonores de la retraite et de la décadence des USA faisaient débat sonore à Washington en même temps que la crise ukrainienne éclatait (voir le 28 février 2014), et avant que Washington, toujours de plus en plus lent, ait réalisé l’importance de la dite-crise, cette fixation symbolique à une référence de cette importance et de cette signification apparaît comme une sorte d’exorcisme : l’image des USA réparée, la narrative peut continuer à être dévidée. Ainsi, le président des Etats-Unis Barack Obama, ayant fixé l’image définitive des USA dans sa confrontation avec la Russie renouvelant la grande victoire du XXème siècle et de l’American Century, peut-il s’en retourner vaquer à ses occupations («Speaking privately with visitors, he is more likely to bring up topics like health care and the Republicans in Congress than Mr. Putin. Ukraine, he tells people, is not a major concern for most Americans...»).

Ainsi allume-t-on la mèche d’une énorme bombe qu’on a soi-même fabriquée et posée là où elle se trouve, avant de s’en retourner en s’en lavant les mains ; et s’en retournant, certes, en ignorant que cette bombe, en explosant, ne manquera pas de vous emporter, vous le premier, vous l’allumeur de mèches...

lundi, 25 février 2013

The Historic Implications and Continuing Ramifications of the Trotsky-Stalin Conflict

Trotski.jpg

Trotsky, Stalin, & the Cold War:
The Historic Implications & Continuing Ramifications of the Trotsky-Stalin Conflict

By Kerry Bolton

Ex; http://www.counter-currents.com/  

Editor’s Note:

This is the second of two chapters on the Moscow Trials that we are reprinting from Kerry Bolton’s new book Stalin: The Enduring Legacy [2] (London: Black House Publishing, 2012). The chapters are reprinted as formatted in the book. Counter-Currents will also run a review of the book, which I highly recommend. 

The Moscow Trials were symptomatic of a great divide that had occurred in Bolshevism. The alliance with Stalin during World War II had formed an assumption among US internationalists that after the Axis defeat a ‘new world order’ would emerge via the United Nations Organisation. This assumption was ill-founded, and the result was the Cold War. Trotskyists emerged as avid Cold Warriors dialectically concluding that the USSR represented the primary obstacle to world socialism. This essay examines the dialectical process by which major factions of Trotskyism became, in Stalinist parlance, a ‘tool of foreign powers and of world capitalism.’

One of the major accusations against Trotsky and alleged Trotskyists during the Moscow Trials of 1936-1938 was that they were agents of foreign capital and foreign powers, including intelligence agencies, and were engaged in sabotage against the Soviet State. In particular, with the advent of Nazi Germany in 1933, Stalin sought to show that in the event of war, which he regarded as inevitable, the Trotskyist network in the USSR would serve as a fifth column for Germany.

The background of these trials has been examined in Chapter III.

Stalin Correct in Fundamental Accusations Against Trotskyites

Staline_et_Trotsky.jpgWhat is significant is that Khrushchev did concede that Stalin was correct in his fundamental allegation that the Trotskyists, Bukharinites et al represented a faction that sought the ‘restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie’. However Khrushchev and even Stalin could not go far enough in their denunciation of Trotskyists et al as seeking to ‘restore capitalism’ and as being agents of foreign powers. To expose the full facts in regard to such accusations would also mean to expose some unpalatable, hidden factors of the Bolshevik Revolution itself, and of Lenin; which would undermine the whole edifice upon which Soviet authority rested – the October 1917 Revolution. Lenin, and Trotsky in particular, had intricate associations with many un-proletarian individuals and interests.

The fact of behind the scenes machinations between the Bolsheviks and international finance was commented upon publicly by two very well-positioned but quite different sources: Henry Wickham Steed, conservative editor of The London Times, and Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labour.

In a first-hand account of the Peace Conference of 1919 Wickham Steed stated that proceedings were interrupted by the return from Moscow of William C Bullitt and Lincoln Steffens, ‘who had been sent to Russia towards the middle of February by Colonel House[1] and Mr. Lansing, for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein for the benefit of the American Commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace.’[2] Steed stated specifically and at some length that international finance was behind the move for recognition of the Bolshevik regime and other moves in favour of the Bolsheviks, stating that: ‘Potent international financial interests were at work in favour of the immediate recognition of the Bolshevists.’[3] In return for diplomatic recognition Tchitcherin, the Bolshevist Commissary for Foreign Affairs, was offering ‘extensive commercial and economic concessions.’[4]

For his part, Samuel Gompers, the American labour leader, was vehemently opposed to the Bolsheviks and any recognition or commercial transactions, stating to the press in regard to negotiations at the international economic conference at Genoa, that a group of ‘predatory international financiers’ were working for the recognition of the Bolshevik regime for the opening up of resources for exploitation. Gompers described this as an ‘Anglo-American-German banking group’. He also commented that prominent Americans who had a history of anti-labour attitudes were advocating recognition of the Bolshevik regime.[5]

Trotsky’s Banking Connections

What is of significance here however is that Trotsky in particular was the focus of attention by many individuals acting on behalf not only of foreign powers but of international financial institutions. Hence while Stalin and even Khrushchev could aver to the association of Trotsky with foreign powers and even – albeit vaguely – with seeking the ‘restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie’, to trace the links more specifically to international finance would inevitably lead to the association also of the Bolshevik regime per se to those same sources, thus undermining the founding myth of the USSR as being the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.

These associations between Trotsky and international finance, as well as foreign intelligence services, have been meticulously documented by Dr Richard Spence.[6] Spence states that ‘Trotsky was the recipient of mysterious financial assistance and was a person of keen interest to German, Russian and British agents’. Such contentions are very similar to the charges against Trotsky et al at the Moscow Trials, and there are details and personalities involved, said to have been extracted under torture and threats, that are in fact confirmed by Spence, who traces Trotsky’s patronage as far back as 1916 when he was an exile from Czarist Russia and was being expelled from a succession of countries in Europe before finding his way to the USA, prior to his return to Russia in 1917 to play his part in the Revolution. Expelled from France to Spain, Trotsky was locked up as a ‘terrorist agitator’ for three and a half days in comfortable conditions.[7] Ernst Bark, perhaps with the use of German funds, arranged Trotsky’s release and his transfer to Cadiz to await passage with his family to New York and paid for first class passage on the SS Montserrat. Bark was cousin of the Czar’s minister of finance Petr Bark who, despite his service to the Czar, had the pro-German, pro-Bolshevik banker Olof Aschberg, of the Nya Banken, Sweden, as his financial agent for his New York dealings. A report reaching US Military Intelligence in 1918 stated that Trotsky had been ‘bought by the Germans’, and that he was organising the Bolshevik[8] movement with Parvus.

From being penniless in Spain to his arrival in New York, Trotsky had arrived with $500 which Spence states is today’s equivalent to about $10,000, although Trotsky liked to depict himself as continuing in proletarian poverty. Immigration authorities also noted that his place of residence would be the less than proletarian Hotel Astor in Times Square.

In New York the Trotskys lived in a Bronx apartment with all the mod-coms of the day. Employed by Novyi Mir, and was hosted by Dr Julius Hammer, a Bolshevik who combined revolution with an opulent lifestyle. Hammer was probably the mysterious ‘Dr M’ referred to by Trotsky in his memoirs, who provided the Trotskys with sightseeing jaunts in his chauffeured car.[9]

One of the main contacts for Trotsky was a maternal uncle, banker and businessman Abram Zhivotovskii. In 1915 Zhivotovskii was jailed in Russia for trading with Germany. The US State Department described Zhivotovskii as outwardly ‘very anti-Bolshevik’, but who had laundered money to the Bolsheviks and other socialist organizations.[10] He seems to have played a double role in moneymaking, working as a financial agent for both Germans and Allies. During the war he maintained an office in Japan under the management of a nephew Iosif Zhivotovskii, who had served as secretary to Sidney Reilly, the so-called ‘British Ace of Spies’ who nonetheless also seems to have been a duplicitous character in dealing with Germany. Spence mentions that Reilly, who had a business in the USA, had gone to Japan when Trotsky was in Spain, and arrived back in the USA around the time of Trotsky’s arrival, the possibility being that Reilly had acquired funds from Trotsky’s uncle to give to his nephew in New York. Another Reilly association with Zhivotovskii was via Alexander Weinstein, who had been Zhivotovskii’s agent in London, and had joined Reilly in 1916. He was supposedly a loyal Czarist but was identified by American Military Intelligence as a Bolshevik.[11] Of further interest is that Alexander’s brother Gregory was business manager of Novyi Mir, the newspaper that employed Trotsky while he was in New York. Reilly and Weinstein were also associated with Benny Sverdlov, a Russian arms broker who was the brother of Yakov Sverdlov, the future Soviet commissar.

These multiple connections between Trotsky and Reilly’s associates are significant here in that one of the accusations raised during the Moscow Trials was that the Trotskyists had had dealings with ‘British spy’ Sidney Reilly.

The dealings of Sir William Wiseman, British Military Intelligence chief in the USA, and his deputy Norman Thwaites, with Reilly and associates were concealed even from other British agencies.[12] Wiseman had kept Trotsky under surveillance in New York. Trotsky secured a visa from the British consulate to proceed to Russia via Nova Scotia and Scandinavia. The Passport Control Section of the British Consulate was under the direction of Thwaites. Trotsky was to remark on his arrival in Russia about the helpful attitude of consular officials, despite his detention as a possible German agent by Canadian authorities at Nova Scotia. Trotsky had been able to pay for tickets aboard the Kristianiafiord for himself and his family, and also for a small entourage. What is additionally interesting about Wiseman is that he was closely associated with banking interests, and around 1921 joined Kuhn, Loeb and Co.[13] In 1955 Wiseman launched his own international bank with investments from Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Rothschild; Rockefeller; Warburg firms, et al[14]. He was thus very close to the international banking dynasties throughout much of his life.

To return to the Kristianiafiord however, on board with Trotsky and his entourage, first class, were Robert Jivotovsky (Zhivotovskii), likely to have been another Trotsky cousin; Israel Fundaminsky, whom Trotsky regarded as a British agent, and Andrei Kalpaschnikoff, who acted as translator when Trotsky was being questioned by British authorities at Nova Scotia. Kalpaschnikoff was closely associated with Vladimir Rogovine, who worked for Weinstein and Reilly. Kalpaschnikoff was also associated with John MacGregor Grant, a friend and business partner of both Reilly and Olof Aschberg. We can therefore see an intricate connection between British super-spy Reilly, and bankers such as Aschberg, who served as a conduit of funds to the Bolsheviks, and Zhivotovskii via Alexander Weinstein.

When Trotsky and several of his entourage were arrested on 29 March at Nova Scotia and questioned by authorities regarding associations with Germany this could well have been an act to dispel any suspicions that Trotsky might be serving British interests. The British had the option of returning him to New York but allowed him to proceed to Russia.[15]

The attitude of Wiseman towards the Bolsheviks once they had achieved nominal power was one of urging recognition, Wiseman cabling President Wilson’s principal adviser Col. Edward House on 1 May 1918 that the allies should intervene at the invitation of the Bolsheviks and help organise the Bolshevik army then fighting the White Armies during the Civil War.[16] This would accord with the aim of certain international bankers to secure recognition of the Bolshevik regime, as noted by both Gompers and Steed.

The financial interests in the USA that formed around the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), founded by presidential adviser Col. Edward M House as a foreign policy think tank of businessmen, politicans and intellectuals, were clamouring for recognition of the Soviets. The CFR issued a report on Bolshevik Russia in 1923, prompted by Lenin’s ‘New Economic Policy’. The report repudiated anti-Bolshevik attitudes and fears that Bolshevism would be spread to other countries (although it had already had a brief but bloody reign in Hungary and revolts in German). CFR historian Peter Grosse writes that the report stated that,

the Bolsheviks were on their way to ‘sanity and sound business practices,’ the Council study group concluded, but the welcome to foreign concessionaires would likely be short-lived…. Thus, the Council experts recommended in March 1923 that American businessmen get into Russia while Lenin’s invitation held good…[17]

Armand Hammer, head of Occidental Petroleum, son of the aforementioned Dr Julius Hammer who had been the Trotsky family’s host in New York, was a globetrotting plutocrat who mixed with the political and business elites of the world for decades. Hammer was in intimate contact with every Soviet leader from Lenin to Gorbachev — except for Stalin.[18] This omission is indicative of the rift that had occurred between the USSR and Western financial and industrial interests with the assumption of Stalin and the defeat of Trotsky.

The CFR report on the USSR that advised American business to get in quick before the situation changed, was prescient. In 1921 Hammer was in the USSR sewing up business deals. Hammer met Trotsky, who asked him whether ‘financial circles in the USA regard Russia as a desirable field of investment?’ Trotsky continued:

Inasmuch as Russia had its Revolution, capital was really safer there than anywhere else because, ‘whatever should happen abroad, the Soviet would adhere to any agreements it might make. Suppose one of your Americans invests money in Russia. When the Revolution comes to America, his property will of course be nationalised, but his agreement with us will hold good and he will thus be in a much more favourable position than the rest of his fellow capitalists.’[19] In contrast to the obliging Trotsky who was willing to guarantee the wealth and investments of Big Business, Hammer said of Stalin:

I never met Stalin and I never had any dealing with him. However it was perfectly clear to me in 1930 that Stalin was not a man with whom you could do business. Stalin believed that the state was capable of running everything, without the support of foreign concessionaires and private enterprise. That was the main reason why I left Moscow: I could see that I would soon be unable to do business there…[20]

As for Trotsky’s attitude toward capitalist investment, were the charges brought against Trotsky et al during the Moscow Trials wholly cynical efforts to disparage and eliminate the perceived opposition to Stalin’s authority, or was there at least some factual basis to the charge that the Trotskyist-Left and Bukharin-Right blocs sought to ‘restore capitalism’ to the USSR? It is of interest in this respect to note that even according to one of Trotsky’s present-day exponents, David North, Trotsky ‘placed greater emphasis than any other Soviet leader of his time on the overriding importance of close economic links between the USSR and the world capitalist market’. North speaking to an Australian Trotskyist conference went on to state of Trotsky’s attitude:

Soviet economic development, he insisted, required both access to the resources of the world market and the intelligent utilisation of the international division of labour. The development of economic planning required at minimum a knowledge of competitive advantage and efficiencies at the international level. It served no rational economic purpose for the USSR to make a virtue of frittering away its own limited resources in a vain effort to duplicate on Soviet soil what it could obtain at far less cost on the world capitalist market…. It is helpful to keep in mind that Trotsky belonged to a generation of Russian Marxists who had utilised the opportunity provided by revolutionary exile to carefully observe and study the workings of the capitalist system in the advanced countries. They were familiar not only with the oft-described ‘horrors’ of capitalism, but also with its positive achievements. … Trotsky argued that a vital precondition for the development of the Soviet economy along socialist lines was its assimilation of the basic techniques of capitalist management, organisation, accounting and production.[21]

It was against this background that during the latter half of the 1930s Stalin acted against the Trotsky and Bukharin blocs as agents of world capitalism and foreign powers. The most cogent defence of the Moscow Trials, The Great Conspiracy Against Russia,[22] was written by two American journalists, Albert E Kahn and Michael Sayers, and carried an endorsement by former US ambassador to the USSR, Joseph Davis, who had witnessed the trials.

Among the charges against Trotsky was that he was in contact with British Intelligence operatives, and was conspiring against Lenin. This is not altogether implausible. Lenin and the Bolshevik faction were in favour of a separate peace between Russia and Germany. Lenin and his entourage had been provided with funds and transport by the German General Staff to travel back to Russia,[23] while Trotsky’s return from New York to Russia had been facilitated by British and American Intelligence interests. Kahn and Sayers commented that ‘for fourteen years, Trotsky had fiercely opposed the Bolsheviks; then in August 1917, a few months before the Bolshevik Revolution he had joined Lenin’s party and risen to power with it. Within the Bolshevik Party, Trotsky was organizing a Left Opposition to Lenin.’[24]

Trotsky was not well disposed to negotiate peace with German imperialists, and it was a major point of debate among the Allies whether certain socialist revolutionaries could be won over to the Allied cause. Trotsky himself had stated in the offices of Novy Mir just before his departure from New York to Russia that although revolutionists would soon overthrow the Kerensky regime they ‘would not make a separate peace with Germany’.[25] From this perspective it would have made sense for William Wiseman to have intervened and for the British authorities to have let Trotsky proceed after having detained him at Nova Scotia.

American mining magnate and banker Colonel William Boyce Thompson, head of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia,[26] was eager to recruit the Bolsheviks for the Allied cause. He stated his intention of providing $1,000,000 of his own money to assist with Bolshevik propaganda directed at Germany and Austria. [27] Thompson’s insistence that if the Allies recognised the Bolsheviks they would not make a separate peace with Germany,[28] accorded with Trotsky’s own attitude insofar as he also wished to see the war end not with a separate peace but with revolutions that would bring down Germany and Austria. His agenda therefore seems to have been quite distinct from that of Lenin’s, and might point to separate sources of funds that were provided to them.

Trotsky’s actions when the Bolsheviks assumed power were consistent with his declarations, and went against Lenin’s policy of ending the war with Germany. As Foreign Commissar Trotsky had been sent to Brest-Litovsk ‘with categorical instructions from Lenin to sign peace.’[29] Instead he called for a Communist uprising in Germany, and stated that although the Russian army could no longer continue in the war and would demobilise, the Soviets would not sign a peace agreement. After Trotsky’s rhetoric at Brest-Litovsk the Germans launched another assault on the Eastern Front, and the new Red Army found itself still fighting the Germans.

It was at this point that R H Bruce Lockhart, special agent of the British War Cabinet, sought out Trotsky, on the instructions from British Prime Minister Lloyd George.

Lockhart, generally considered the typical anti-Bolshevik Establishment figure, was actually well disposed towards the Bolsheviks and like Colonel Thompson, hoped to win them over to the Allies. At one point his wife warned that his colleagues in Britain thought be might be going ‘Red’. Lockhart wrote of the situation:

Russia was out of the war. Bolshevism would last – certainly as long as the war lasted. I deprecated as sheer folly our militarist propaganda, because it took no account of the war-weariness which had raised the Bolsheviks to the supreme power. In my opinion, we had to take the Bolshevik peace proposals seriously. Our policy should now aim at achieving an anti-German peace in Russia’.[30]

Coincidentally, ‘an anti-German peace in Russia’ seems to precisely describe the aim of Trotsky.

Trotsky intended that the World War would be transformed into a revolutionary war, with the starting point being revolutions in Germany and Austria. This would certainly accord with Colonel Thompson’s intentions to fund Bolshevist propaganda in Germany and Austria with $1,000,000. Thompson was in communication with Trotsky via Raymond Robins, his deputy with the Red Cross Mission, and like him an enthusiast for the Bolshevik regime.[31] Lloyd George had met Thompson and had been won over to the aim of contacting Lenin and Trotsky. Lockhart was instructed to return to Russia to establish ‘unofficial contact with the Bolsheviks’.[32] Lockhart relates that he met Trotsky for two hours at the latter’s office at Smolny. While Lockhart was highly impressed with Trotsky he did not regard the Foreign Commissar as able to weld sufficient influence to replace Lenin. Trotsky’s parting words to Lockhart at this first meeting were: ‘Now is the big opportunity for the Allied Governments’. Thereafter Lockhart saw Trotsky on a daily basis. [33] Lockhart stated that Trotsky was willing to bring Soviet Russia over to Britain:

He considered that war was inevitable. If the Allies would send a promise of support, he informed me that he would sway the decision of the Government in favour of war. I sent several telegrams to London requesting an official message that would enable me to strengthen Trotsky’s hands. No message was sent.[34]

Stalineooooo.jpgGiven Trotsky’s position in regard to Germany, and the statements of Lockhart in his memoirs, the Stalinist accusation is entirely plausible that Trotsky was the focus of Allied support, and would explain why the British expedited Trotsky’s return to Russia. Indeed, Lockhart was to remark that the British view was that they might be able to make use of the dissensions between Trotsky and Lenin, and believed that the Allies could reach an accord with Soviet Russia because of the extravagant peace demands of the Germans.[35] However from what Lockhart sates, it seems that the Allied procrastination in regard to recondition of the Bolsheviks was the uncertainty that they constituted a stable and lasting Government, and that they were suspicious of the Bolshevik intentions towards Germany, with Lenin and Trotsky still widely regarded as German agents. [36]

The period preceding World War II, particularly the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, served as a catalyst for Stalin’s offensive against Trotskyists and other suspect elements. Trotsky had since his exile been promoted in the West as the great leader of the Bolshevik Revolution[37], while his own background had been one of opportunism, for the most part as an anti-Leninist Menshevik. [38] It was only in August 1917, seeing the situation in Russia, that Trotsky applied for membership of the Bolshevik Party.[39] Trotsky had joined the Bolshevik Party with his entire faction, a faction that remained intact within the Soviet apparatus, and was ready to be activated after Stalin’s election as General Secretary in 1922. Trotsky admits to a revolutionary network from 1923 when he wrote in his 1938 eulogy to his son Leon Sedov: ‘Leon threw himself headlong into the work of the Opposition…Thus, at seventeen, he began the life of a fully conscious revolutionist, quickly grasped the art of conspiratorial work, illegal meetings, and the secret issuing and distribution of Opposition documents. The Komsomol (Communist Youth organization) rapidly developed its own cadres of Opposition leaders.’[40] Hence Trotsky had freely admitted to the fundamental charges of the Stalinist regime: the existence of a widespread Trotskyist ‘conspiracy’. Indeed, as far back as 1921, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had already passes a resolution banning all ‘factions’ in the Party, specifically warning Trotsky against ‘factional activities’, and condemning the factionalist activities of what the resolution called ‘Trotskyites’. [41]

In 1924 Trotsky met with Boris Savinkov, a Socialist Revolutionary, who had served as head of the terrorist wing, the so-called ‘Fighting Organization’, of the Party, and who had been Deputy Minister of War in the Kerensky Government. After the triumph of the Bolsheviks Savinkov, leaving Russia in 1920, became associated with French and Polish authorities, and with British agents Lockhart[42] and Sidney Reilly. [43] Savinkov was involved in counter-revolutionary activities, in trying to form an army to overthrow the Bolsheviks. Winston Churchill confirms Savinkov’s meeting with Trotsky in 1924, Churchill himself being involved in the anti-Soviet machinations, writing in his Great Contemporaries: ‘In June 1924, Kamenev and Trotsky definitely invited him (Savinkov) to return’.[44]

In 1924 a leading Trotskyite, Christian Rakovsky, arrived in Britain as Soviet Ambassador. According to the testimony at the Moscow Trial during March 1938 Rakovsky admitted to meeting two British agents, Lockhart and Captain Armstrong. Rakovsky is said to have confessed at this trial that Lockhart and Armstrong had told him that he had been permitted entry into Britain because of his association with Trotsky, as they wanted to cultivated relations with the latter. When Rakovsky reported back to Trotsky several months later, Trotsky was alleged to have been interested. In 1926 Rakovsky was transferred to France prior to which he was alleged to have been instructed by Trotsky to seek out contacts with ‘conservatives circles’ who might support an uprising, as Trotsky considered the situation in Russia to be right for a coup. Rakovsky, as instructed, met several French industrialists, including the grain merchant Louis Dreyfus, and the flax merchant Nicole, both Deputies of the French Parliament.[45] Rakovsky in his testimony during the 1936 trial of Bukharin, et al, Rakovsky being one of the defendants, relates the manner by which he was approached by various intelligence agencies, including those of Japan when in 1934 Rakovsky was head of a Soviet Red Cross Delegation.[46] Rakovsky spoke of the difficulty the Trotskyites had in maintaining relations with both British and Japanese intelligence agencies, since the two states were becoming antagonistic over problems in China.[47] Rakovsky explained that: ‘We Trotskyites have to play three cards at the present moment: the German, Japanese and British…’[48] At that time the Trotskyites – or at least Rakovsky – regarded the likelihood of a Japanese attack on the USSR as more likely than a German attack. Rakovsky even then alluded to his belief that an accord between Hitler and Stalin was possible. It seems plausible enough that Trotskyites were indeed looking toward an invasion of the USSR as the means of destabilising the regime during which Trotskyist cells could launch their counter-revolution. Certainly we know from the account of Churchill that Trotsky met the ultra-terrorist Socialist Revolutionary Savinkov, who was himself involved with British Intelligence via Reilly and Lockhart. Rakovsky stated of a possible Hitler-Stalin Pact:

Personally I thought that the possibility was not excluded that Hitler would seek a rapprochement with the government of the USSR. I cited the policy of Richelieu: in his own country he exterminated the Protestants, while in his foreign policy he concluded alliances with the Protestant German princes. The relations between Germany and Poland were still in the stage of their inception at the time. Japan, on the other hand, was a potent aggressor against the USSR. For us Trotskyites the Japanese card was extremely important, but, on the other hand, we should not overrate the importance of Japan as our ally against the Soviet government.[49]

As far as the Stalinist allegations go in regard to the Trotskyists aligning with foreign powers and viewing an invasion of the USSR as a catalyst for revolution, other ultra-Marxists had taken paths far more unlikely. As mentioned Savinkov, who had been one of the most violent of the Socialist Revolutionaries in Czarist Russia, had sought out British assistance in forming a counter-revolutionary army. Savinkov had fled to Poland in 1919 where he tried to organize ‘the evacuation committee’ within the Polish armies then attacking Russia.[50] Savinkov’s colleagues in Poland, Merezhkovsky, and his wife Zinaida Hippius, who had been ardent Socialist Revolutionary propagandists, later became supporters of Mussolini and then of Hitler, in the hope of overthrowing Stalin[51]. Therefore the Stalinist allegation of Trotskyite collusion even with Fascist powers is plausible.

It is the same road that resulted in the alliance of many Trotskyists, Mensheviks and other Leftists with the CIA, and their metamorphoses into ardent Cold Warriors. It is the same road that brought leading American Trotsky apologist Professor Sidney Hook, ‘a lifelong Menshevik’, to the leadership of a major CIA front, the previously considered Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Max Shachtman

Max Shachtman, one of Trotsky’s leading representatives in the USA[52], is pivotal when considering why Trotskyites became ardent Cold Warriors, CIA front men, apologists for US foreign policy, and continue to champion the USA as the only ‘truly revolutionary’ state.

Expelled from the Communist Party USA in 1928 Shachtman co-founded the Communist League and the Socialist Workers Party. He then split to form the Workers Party of the United States in 1940, which became the Independent Socialist League and merged with the Socialist Party in 1958. [53] The Socialist Party factionalised into the Democratic Socialists and the Social Democrats.

Shachtman was of course scathing of the Moscow Trials. His critique is standard, and will not be of concern here. [54] What is of interest is Shachtman’s surpassing of Trotsky himself in his opposition to the USSR, his faction (the so-called ‘Third Camp’) being what he considered as a purified, genuine Trotskyism, which eventuated into apologists for US foreign policy.

The Shachtmanist critique of the USSR was that it had at an early stage been transformed from ‘government ‘bureaucratism to ‘party bureaucratism’.[55] ‘Soviet bureaucratism became party bureaucratism. In increasing number the government official was the party official.’[56] ‘We do not have a workers’ state but a workers’ state with bureaucratic deformations’, Shachtman stated in quoting Trotsky as far back as 1922. And again from Trotsky: ‘We have a bureaucracy not only in the Soviet institutions, but in the institutions of the party’… Shachtman continues: ‘A month later, in a veiled public attack upon Stalin as head of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, he repeated his view that the state machine was still “a survival to a large extent of the former bureaucracy … with only a superficial new coat of paint.”’[57]

While in 1937 Shachtman declared that the USSR should nonetheless be defended against aggression from, for example, Nazi Germany and that it was a Stalinist slur to think that Trotsky would be an enemy of the USSR in such circumstances[58], by 1940 Shachtman was at loggerheads with Trotsky himself and the ‘Cannon’[59] group in the Workers Party.

The Trotskyites were agreed that Stalinist Russia had become a ‘degenerated’ workers’ state,’ however the Cannon-Trotsky line and the position of the Fourth International was that should the USSR be attacked by capitalist or fascist powers, because it still had a so-called ‘progressive’ economy based on the nationalisation of property, the USSR must be defended on that basis alone. The Shachtman line, on the other hand, argued from what they considered to be a dialectical position:

Just as it was once necessary, in connection with the trade union problem, to speak concretely of what kind of workers’ state exists in the Soviet Union, so it is necessary to establish, in connection with the present war, the degree of the degeneration of the Soviet state. The dialectical method of treating such questions makes this mandatory upon us. And the degree of the degeneration of the regime cannot be established by abstract reference to the existence of nationalized property, but only by observing the realities of living events.

The Fourth International established, years ago, the fact that the Stalinist regime (even though based upon nationalized property) had degenerated to the point where it was not only capable of conducting reactionary wars against the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard, and even against colonial peoples, but did in fact conduct such wars. Now, in our opinion, on the basis of the actual course of Stalinist policy (again, even though based upon nationalized property), the Fourth International must establish the fact that the Soviet Union (i.e., the ruling bureaucracy and the armed forces serving it) has degenerated to the point where it is capable of conducting reactionary wars even against capitalist states (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, now Finland, and tomorrow Rumania and elsewhere). This is the point which forms the nub of our difference with you and with the Cannon faction.[60]

Shachtman now expressed his approach unequivocally:

War is a continuation of politics, and if Stalinist policy, even in the occupied territory where property has been statified, preserves completely its reactionary character, then the war it is conducting is reactionary. In that case, the revolutionary proletariat must refuse to give the Kremlin and its army material and military aid. It must concentrate all efforts on overturning the Stalinist regime. That is not our war! Our war is against the counterrevolutionary bureaucracy at the present time!

In other words, I propose, in the present war, a policy of revolutionary defeatism in the Soviet Union, as explained in the statement of the Minority on the Russian question – and in making this proposal I do not feel myself one whit less a revolutionary class patriot than I have always been.[61]

That was the Shachtmanite line during World War II: that it was better that Nazi Germany defeated Stalin than that the ‘degenerated workers’ state’ should continue to exist. The same thinking emerged during the Cold War, shortly after World War II, when Shachtman began to speak about the threat of Stalinist parties throughout the world as agencies for Soviet policy, a theme that would become a basis of US attitudes towards the USSR:

The Stalinist parties are indeed agents of the Kremlin oligarchy, no matter what country they function in. The interests and the fate of these Stalinist parties are inseparably intertwined with the interests and fate of the Russian bureaucracy. The Stalinist parties are everywhere based upon the power of the Russian bureaucracy, they serve this power, they are dependent upon it, and they cannot live without it.[62]

By 1948 Shachtmanism as a Cold Warrior apologia for American foreign policy was taking shape. In seeing positive signs in the Titoist Yugoslavia break with the USSR, Shachtman wrote:

In the first place, the division in the capitalist camp is, to all practical intents, at an end. In any case, there is nothing like the division that existed from 1939 onward and which gave Stalinist Russia such tremendous room for maneuvering. In spite of all the differences that still exist among them, the capitalist world under American imperialist leadership and drive is developing an increasingly solid front against Russian imperialism.[63]

In other words, Shachtman saw unity among the capitalist states against Stalinist Russia as a positive sign. The overthrow of Stalinism became the first priority of Shachtmanite Trotskyism in the Cold War era, as it had during World War II.

In 1948 Shachtman scathingly attacked the position of the Fourth International in having continued to defend the USSR as a ‘degenerated workers’ state’, and of its mistaken belief that the Stalinist ‘bureaucratic dictatorship’ world fall apart during World War II. He pointed out that Stalinist imperialism had emerged from the war victorious.[64]

From here it was but a short way for the Shachtmanites to embrace the Cold War opposition to the USSR, and for the heirs of this to continue as enthusiasts for US foreign policy to the present-day.

By 1950 Stalinism had become the major problem for world socialism, Shachtman now writing as head of the Independent Socialist League:

The principal new problem faced by Marxian theory, and therewith Marxian practice, is the problem of Stalinism. What once appeared to many to be either an academic or ‘foreign’ problem is now, it should at last be obvious, a decisive problem for all classes in all countries. If it is understood as a purely Russian phenomenon or as a problem ‘in itself,’ it is of course not understood at all.[65]

Natalia Sedova Trotsky

Natalia Sedova, Trotsky’s widow, endorsed the Shachtmanite line, declaring that the American-led alliance against the USSR would have been approved by her late husband. Her letter of resignation to the Fourth International and to the Socialist Workers Party (USA) is worth reproducing in its entirety:

You know quite well that I have not been in political agreement with you for the past five or six years, since the end of the [Second World] war and even earlier. The position you have taken on the important events of recent times shows me that, instead of correcting your earlier errors, you are persisting in them and deepening them. On the road you have taken, you have reached a point where it is no longer possible for me to remain silent or to confine myself to private protests. I must now express my opinions publicly.

The step which I feel obliged to take has been a grave and difficult one for me, and I can only regret it sincerely. But there is no other way. After a great deal of reflections and hesitations over a problem which pained me deeply, I find that I must tell you that I see no other way than to say openly that our disagreements make it impossible for me to remain any longer in your ranks.

The reasons for this final action on my part are known to most of you. I repeat them here briefly only for those to whom they are not familiar, touching only on our fundamentally important differences and not on the differences over matters of daily policy which are related to them or which follow from them.

Obsessed by old and outlived formulas, you continue to regard the Stalinist state as a workers’ state. I cannot and will not follow you in this.

Virtually every year after the beginning of the fight against the usurping Stalinist bureaucracy, L D Trotsky repeated that the regime was moving to the right, under conditions of a lagging world revolution and the seizure of all political positions in Russia by the bureaucracy. Time and again, he pointed out how the consolidation of Stalinism in Russia led to the worsening of the economic, political and social positions of the working class, and the triumph of a tyrannical and privileged aristocracy. If this trend continues, he said, the revolution will be at an end and the restoration of capitalism will be achieved.

That, unfortunately, is what has happened even if in new and unexpected forms. There is hardly a country in the world where the authentic ideas and bearers of socialism are so barbarously hounded. It should be clear to everyone that the revolution has been completely destroyed by Stalinism. Yet you continue to say that under this unspeakable regime, Russia is still a workers’ state. I consider this a blow at socialism. Stalinism and the Stalinist state have nothing whatever in common with a workers’ state or with socialism. They are the worst and the most dangerous enemies of socialism and the working class.

You now hold that the states of Eastern Europe over which Stalinism established its domination during and after the war, are likewise workers’ states. This is equivalent to saying that Stalinism has carried out a revolutionary socialist role. I cannot and will not follow you in this.

After the war and even before it ended, there was a rising revolutionary movement of the masses in these Eastern countries. But it was not these masses that won power and it was not a workers’ state that was established by their struggle. It was the Stalinist counterrevolution that won power, reducing these lands to vassals of the Kremlin by strangling the working masses, their revolutionary struggles and their revolutionary aspirations.

By considering that the Stalinist bureaucracy established workers’ states in these countries, you assign to it a progressive and even revolutionary role. By propagating this monstrous falsehood to the workers’ vanguard, you deny to the Fourth International all the basic reasons for existence as the world party of the socialist revolution. In the past, we always considered Stalinism to be a counterrevolutionary force in every sense of the term. You no longer do so. But I continue to do so.

In 1932 and 1933, the Stalinists, in order to justify their shameless capitulation to Hitlerism, declared that it would matter little if the Fascists came to power because socialism would come after and through the rule of Fascism. Only dehumanized brutes without a shred of socialist thought or spirit could have argued this way. Now, notwithstanding the revolutionary aims which animate you, you maintain that the despotic Stalinist reaction which has triumphed in Europe is one of the roads through which socialism will eventually come. This view marks an irredeemable break with the profoundest convictions always held by our movement and which I continue to share.

I find it impossible to follow you in the question of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. All the sympathy and support of revolutionists and even of all democrats, should go to the Yugoslav people in their determined resistance to the efforts of Moscow to reduce them and their country to vassalage. Every advantage should be taken of the concessions which the Yugoslav regime now finds itself obliged to make to the people. But your entire press is now devoted to an inexcusable idealization of the Titoist bureaucracy for which no ground exists in the traditions and principles of our movement.

This bureaucracy is only a replica, in a new form, of the old Stalinist bureaucracy. It was trained in the ideas, the politics and morals of the GPU. Its regime differs from Stalin’s in no fundamental regard. It is absurd to believe or to teach that the revolutionary leadership of the Yugoslav people will develop out of this bureaucracy or in any way other than in the course of struggle against it.

Most insupportable of all is the position on the war to which you have committed yourselves. The third world war which threatens humanity confronts the revolutionary movement with the most difficult problems, the most complex situations, the gravest decisions. Our position can be taken only after the most earnest and freest discussions. But in the face of all the events of recent years, you continue to advocate, and to pledge the entire movement to, the defense of the Stalinist state. You are even now supporting the armies of Stalinism in the war which is being endured by the anguished Korean people. I cannot and will not follow you in this.

As far back as 1927, Trotsky, in reply to a disloyal question put to him in the Political Bureau [of the Soviet Communist Party] by Stalin, stated his views as follows: For the socialist fatherland, yes! For the Stalinist regime, no! That was in 1927! Now, twenty-three years later Stalin has left nothing of the socialist fatherland. It has been replaced by the enslavement and degradation of the people by the Stalinist autocracy. This is the state you propose to defend in the war, which you are already defending in Korea.

I know very well how often you repeat that you are criticizing Stalinism and fighting it. But the fact is that your criticism and your fight lose their value and can yield no results because they are determined by and subordinated to your position of defense of the Stalinist state. Whoever defends this regime of barbarous oppression, regardless of the motives, abandons the principles of socialism and internationalism.

In the message sent me from the recent convention of the SWP you write that Trotsky’s ideas continue to be your guide. I must tell you that I read these words with great bitterness. As you observe from what I have written above, I do not see his ideas in your politics. I have confidence in these ideas. I remain convinced that the only way out of the present situation is the social revolution, the self-emancipation of the proletariat of the world.[66]

Natalia Trotsky, like the Shachtmanites, regarded the USSR as having irredeemably destroyed Marxism, and that the only option left was to destroy the USSR, which meant aligning with the USA in the Cold War.

It was this bellicose anti-Stalinism that brought the Shachtmanites into the US foreign policy establishment during the Cold War, and beyond, to the present-day. Haberkern, an admirer of Shachtman’s early commitment to Trotskyism and opposition to Stalinism, lamented:

There is, unfortunately, a sad footnote to Shachtman’s career. Beginning in the 50s he began to move to the right in response to the discouraging climate of the Cold War. He ended up a Cold Warrior and apologist for the Meany wing of the AFL-CIO.[67] But that should not diminish the value of his earlier contributions.[68]

Cold War and Beyond

Professor Hook and Max Shachtman veered increasingly towards a pro-US position to the point that Hook, while maintaining his commitment to Social-Democracy, voted for Richard Nixon and publicly defended President Ronald Reagan’s policies.

During the 1960s, Hook critiqued the New Left and became an outspoken supporter of the Vietnam War. In 1984 he was selected by the National Endowment for the Humanities to give the annual Jefferson Lecture, ‘the highest honor the federal government confers for distinguished intellectual achievement in the humanities’. [69] On May 23 1985 Hook was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Reagan. Edward S Shapiro writing in the American ‘conservative’ journal First Principles, summarised Hook’s position:

One of America’s leading anticommunist intellectuals,[70] Hook supported American entry into the Korean War, the isolation of Red China, the efforts of the United States government to maintain a qualitative edge in nuclear weapons, the Johnson administration’s attempt to preserve a pro-western regime in South Vietnam, and the campaign of the Reagan administration to overthrow the communist regime in Nicaragua.

Those both within and outside of conservative circles viewed Hook as one of the gurus of the neoconservative revival during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985, President Reagan presented Hook with the Presidential Medal of Freedom for being one of the first ‘to warn the intellectual world of its moral obligations and personal stake in the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism’.[71]

In the 1960s Shachtmanism aligned with the Democratic Party and was also involved with the New Left. By the mid 1960s such was the Shachtmanite opposition to the USSR that they had arrived on issues of American foreign policy that were the same as Hook’s, including supporting the American presence in Vietnam. In 1972 the Shachtmanists endorsed Leftist Senator Henry Jackson for the Democratic presidential nomination against Leftist George McGovern whom they regarded as an appeaser toward the USSR. Jackson was both pro-war and vehemently anti-Soviet, advocating a ‘hawkish’ position on foreign policy towards the USSR. Like Hook, Jackson was also awarded the Medal of Freedom by President Reagan in 1984.

At this time Tom Kahn, a prominent Shachtmanite and an organizer of the AFL-CIO, who will be considered below, was Senator Jackson’s chief speechwriter.[72] Many of Jackson’s aides were to become prominent in the oddly ‘neo-conservative’ movement, including veteran Trotskyites Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith, all of whom became prominent in the Administration of President George H W Bush, all of whom helped to instigate the present war against Islam, which they began to call ‘Islamofascism’, as a new means of extending American world supremacy.

Tom Kahn, who remained an avid follower of Shachtman, explained his mentor’s position on the USA in Vietnam in this way, while insisting that Shachtman never compromised his Socialist ideals:

His views on Vietnam were, and are, unpopular on the Left. He had no allusions about the South Vietnamese government, but neither was he confused about the totalitarian nature of the North Vietnamese regime. In the South there were manifest possibilities for a democratic development… He knew that those democratic possibilities would be crushed if Hanoi’s military takeover of the South succeeded. He considered the frustration of the attempt to be a worthy objective of American policy…[73]

This position in it own right can be readily justified by dialectics, as the basis for the support of Trotskyist factions, including those of both Hook and Shachtman during the Cold War, and the present legacy of the so-called ‘neo-cons’ in backing American foreign policy as the manifestation of a ‘global democratic revolution’, as a development of Trotsky’s ‘world proletarian revolution.’ 

National Endowment for Democracy

It was from this milieu that the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was formed, which took up form the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom.

President George W Bush embraced the world revolutionary mission of the USA, stating in 2003 to NED that the war in Iraq was the latest front in the ‘global democratic revolution’ led by the United States. ‘The revolution under former president Ronald Reagan freed the people of Soviet-dominated Europe, he declared, and is destined now to liberate the Middle East as well’. [74]

NED was established in 1983 at the prompting of Shachtmanist veteran Tom Kahn, and endorsed by an Act of US Congress introduced by Congressman George Agree. Carl Gershman, [75] a Shachtmanite, was appointed president of NED in 1984, and remains so. Gershman had been a founder and Executive Director (1974-1980) of Social Democrats USA (SD-USA).[76] Among the founding directors of NED was Albert Glotzer, a national committee member of the SD-USA, who had served as Trotsky’s bodyguard and secretary in Turkey in 1931,[77] who had assisted Shachtman with founding the Workers Party of the United States.

Congressman Agree and Tom Kahn believed that the USA needed a means, apart from the CIA, of supporting subversive movements against the USSR. Kahn, who became International Affairs Director of the AFL-CIO, was particularly spurred by the need to support the Solidarity movement in Poland, and had been involved with AFL-CIO meetings with Leftists from Latin America and South Africa. [78]

Kahn had joined the Young Socialist League, the youth wing of Shachtman’s Independent Socialist League, [79] and the Young People’s Socialist League, which he continued to support until his death in 1992. Kahn was impressed by the Shachtman opposition to the USSR as the primary obstacle to world socialism. [80] He built up an anti-Soviet network throughout the world in ‘opposition to the accommodationist policies of détente’.[81] There was a particular focus on assisting Solidarity in Poland from 1980.[82] Racehlle Horowitz’s eulogy to Kahn ends with her confidence that had he been alive, he would have been a vigorous supporter of the war in Iraq. [83]

NED is funded by US Congress and supports ‘activists and scholars’ with 1000 grants in over 90 countries.[84]  NED describes its program thus:

From time to time Congress has provided special appropriations to the Endowment to carry out specific democratic initiatives in countries of special interest, including Poland (through the trade union Solidarity), Chile, Nicaragua, Eastern Europe (to aid in the democratic transition following the demise of the Soviet bloc), South Africa, Burma, China, Tibet, North Korea and the Balkans. With the latter, NED supported a number of civic groups, including those that played a key role in Serbia’s electoral breakthrough in the fall of 2000. More recently, following 9/11 and the NED Board’s adoption of its third strategic document, special funding has been provided for countries with substantial Muslim populations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.[85]

NED therefore serves as a kind of ‘Comintern’ of the so-called ‘American democratic revolution’ throughout the world. The subversion by the USA, culturally, politically, and economically, with its front-groups, spies, fellow-travellers, activists, and outright revolutionaries, is more far-reaching than the USSR’s allegedly ‘communist’ subversion ever was.

The accusation by the Stalinists at the Moscow Trials of the 1930s was that the Trotskyists were agents of foreign powers and would reintroduce capitalism. The crisis in Marxism caused by the Stalinist regime – the so-called ‘betrayal of the revolution’ as Trotsky himself termed it – resulted in such outrage among the Trotskyites that they were willing to whore themselves and undertake anything to bring down the Soviet edifice.

Notes

[1] American President Woodrow Wilson’s principal adviser and confidante.

[2] Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years 1892-1922 A personal narrative, ‘The Peace Conference, The Bullitt Mission’, Vol. II.  (New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1924), 301.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Samuel Gompers, ‘Soviet Bribe Fund Here Says Gompers, Has Proof That Offers Have Been Made, He Declares, Opposing Recognition. Propaganda Drive. Charges Strong Group of Bankers With Readiness to Accept Lenin’s Betrayal of Russia’, The New York Times, 1 May 1922.

[6] Richard B Spence, ‘Hidden Agendas: Spies, Lies and Intrigue Surrounding Trotsky’s American Visit, January-April 1917’, Revolutionary Russia, Volume 21, Issue 1 June 2008, 33 – 55.

[7] Ibid.

[8] It is more accurate to state that Trotsky managed to straddle both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks until the impending success of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Military Intelligence Division, 9140-6073, Memorandum # 2, 23 August 1918, 2. Cited by Spence, op.cit.

[12] Spence, ibid.

[13] Wiseman became a partner in 1929.

[14] ‘Sir William’s New Bank’, Time, October 17 1955.

[15] The foregoing on Trotsky’s associations from Spain to New York and his transit back to Russia are indebted to Spence, op.cit.

[16] Edward M. House, ed. Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Col. House (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Co.), Vol. III, 421.

[17] Peter Grosse, Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), ‘Basic Assumptions’. The entire book can be read online at: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html [3]

[18] Armand Hammer, Witness to History (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 221.

[19] Ibid., 160.

[20] Ibid., 221.

[21] David North, ‘Leon Trotsky and the Fate of Socialism in the 20th Century’, opening lecture to the International Summer School on ‘Marxism and the Fundamental Problems of the 20th Century’, organised by the International Committee of the Fourth International and the Socialist Equality Party of Australia, Sydney, Australia, January 3 1998. David North is the national secretary of the Socialist Equality Party in the USA, and has lectured extensively in Europe, Asia, the US and Russia on Marxism and the program of the Fourth International. http://www.wsws.org/exhibits/trotsky/trlect.htm [4] (accessed 12 March 2010).

[22] Albert E Kahn and Michael Sayers, The Great Conspiracy Against Russia, (London: Collet’s Holdings Ltd., 1946).

[23] Antony Sutton, op.cit., 39-42.

[24] Kahn and Sayers, op.cit. p. 29.

[25] ‘Calls People War Weary, But Leo Trotsky Says They Do Tot Want Separate Peace’, The New York Times, 16 March 1917.

[26] The real purpose of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia was to examine how commercial relations could be established with the fledgling Bolshevik regime, as indicated by the fact that there were more business representatives in the Mission than there were medical personnel. See: Dr Anton Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1974), 71-88. K R Bolton, Revolution from Above (London: Arktos Media Ltd., 2011) 63-64.

[27] ‘Gives Bolsheviki a Million’, Washington Post, 2 February 1918, cited by Sutton, op.cit., ., pp. 82-83.

[28] The New York Times, 27 January 1918, op.cit.

[29] Kahn and Sayers, op.cit., p. 29.

[30] R H Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (London: G P Putnam’s Sons, 1933), Book Four, ‘History From the Inside’, Chapter I.

[31] Antony Sutton, op.cit., 84, 86.

[32] R H Bruce Lockhart, op.cit.

[33] Ibid., Chapter III.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid. Lockhart observed that while the German peace terms received 112 votes from the Central Executive Committee of the Bolshevik Party, there had been 86 against, and 25 abstentions, among the latter of whom was Trotsky.

[36] Ibid., Chapter IV.

[37] That at least was the perception of Stalinists of Trotsky’s depiction by the West, as portrayed by Kahn and Sayers, op.cit., 194.

[38] Kahn and Sayers cite a number of Lenin’s statements regarding Trotsky, dating from 1911, when Lenin stated that Trotsky slides from one faction to another and back again, but ultimately ‘I must declare that Trotsky represents his own faction only…’ Ibid., 195.

[39] Ibid., 199.

[40] Leon Trotsky, Leon Sedov: Son-Friend-Fighter, 1938, cited by Kahn and Sayers, 205.

[41] Ibid., 204.

[42] R H Bruce Lockhart, op.cit., Book Three: War & Peace, Chapter IX. Lockhart described Savinkov as a professional ‘schemer’, who ‘had mingled so much with spies and agents-provocateurs that, like the hero in his own novel, he hardly knew whether he was deceiving himself or those whom he meant to deceive’. Lockhart commented that Savinkov had ‘entirely captivated Mr Churchill, who saw in him a Russian Bonaparte’.

[43] Reilly, the British ‘super agent’ although widely known for his anti-Bolshevik views, prior to his becoming a ‘super spy’ and possibly working for the intelligence agencies of four states, by his own account had been arrested in 1892 in Russia by the Czarist secret police as a messenger for the revolutionary Friends of Enlightenment.

[44] Kahn and Sayers, op.cit., 208.

[45] Commissariat of Justice, Report of the Case of the Anti-Soviet ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites’, Heard Before The Military Collegium of the Court of the USSR, Moscow, March 24 1938, 307.

[46] Ibid., 288.

[47]  Ibid. 293.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ‘Eschatology and the Appeal of Revolution’, California Slavic Studies, Volume. II, University of California Press, California, 1930, 116.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Shachtman was one of the two most prominent Trotskyites in the USA according to Trotskyist historian Ernest Haberkern, Introduction to Max Shachtman, http://www.marxists.org/archive/shachtma/intro.htm [5]

[53] ‘British Trotskyism in 1931’, Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism Online: Revolutionary History, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/revhist/backiss/vol1/no1/glotzer.html [6]

[54] Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936).

[55] Max Shachtman, ‘Trotsky Begins the Fight’, The Struggle for the New Course (New York: New International Publishing Co., 1943).

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Leon Trotsky, In Defence of the Soviet Union, Max Shachtman, ‘Introduction.’ (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937).

[59] James P Cannon, a veteran Trotskyist and former colleague of Shachtman’s.

[60] Max Shachtman, ‘The Crisis in the American Party: An Open Letter in Reply to Comrade Leon Trotsky’, New International, Vol.6 No.2, March 1940), 43-51.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Max Shachtman, ‘The Nature of the Stalinist Parties: Their Class Roots, Political Role and Basic Aim’, The New International: A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism, Vol.13 No.3, March 1947, 69-74.

[63]Max Shachtman, ‘Stalinism on the Decline: Tito versus Stalin The Beginning of the End of the Russian Empire’, New International, Vol. XIV No.6, August 1948, 172-178.

[64] Max Shachtman, ‘The Congress of the Fourth International: An Analysis of the Bankruptcy of “Orthodox Trotskyism”’, New International, Vol.XIV, No.8, October 1948, pp.236-245.

[65] Max Shachtman, ‘Reflections on a Decade Past: On the Tenth Anniversary of Our Movement’, The New International: A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism, Vol.16 No.3, May-June 1950, pp.131-144.

[66] Natalia Sedova Trotsky, May 9, 1951, Labor Action, June 17, 1951, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/socialistvoice/natalia38.html [7]

[67] American Federation of Labor-Central Industrial Organization.

[68] Haberkern, op.cit.

[69] Sidney Hook, ‘Education in Defense of a Free Society’, 1984, Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities, National Endowment for Humanities, http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/jefflect.html [8]

[70] Again, there is obfuscation with the use of the term ‘anti-Communist’. What is meant in such cases is not opposition to Communism, but opposition to Stalinism, and the course the USSR had set upon after the elimination of the Trotskyites, et al. Many of these so-called ‘anti-Communists’ in opposing the USSR considered themselves loyal to the legacy of Trotsky.

[71] Edward S Shapiro, ‘Hook, Sidney’, First Principles: The Home of American Intellectual Conservatism, July 3,  2009, http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=699&loc=r [9]

[72] Tom Kahn, ‘Max Shachtman: His Ideas and His Movement’, Editor’s Note on Kahn, Dissent Magazine, 252 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d11Khan.pdf [10]

[73] Tom Kahn, Democratiya 11, 2007, reprinted in Dissent Magazine, ibid., 258.

[74] Fred Barbash, ‘Bush: Iraq Part of ‘Global Democratic Revolution’: Liberation of Middle East Portrayed as Continuation of Reagan’s Policies’, Washington Post, 6 November 6, 2003.

[75] Gershman served as Senior Counsellor to the United States Representative to the United Nations beginning in 1981. As it happens, the Representative he was advising was fellow Social Democrats comrade, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had begun her political career in the (Trotskyist) Young People’s Socialist League, a branch of the Shachtmanist-orientated Socialist Party, as had many other ‘neo-cons.’

[76] The Social Democrats USA had originated in 1972 after a split with the Trotskyist-orientated Socialist Party. The honorary chairman of the Social Democrats USA until his death in 1984 was Prof. Sidney Hook.

[77] Glotzer was a leading Trotskyist. Expelled from the Communist Party USA in 1928 along with Max Shachtman, they founded the Communist League and the subsequent factions. When the Socialist Party factionalised in 1972 Glotzer joined the Social Democrats – USA faction, which remained closest to Shachtmanism, and which supported US foreign policy. Even in 1981 Glotzer was still involved with luminaries of the Socialist Workers Party. “British Trotskyism in 1931”, Encyclopaedia of Trotskyism Online: Revolutionary History, http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/revhist/backiss/vol1/no1/glotzer.html (Accessed 7 March 2010).

[78] Rachelle Horowitz, “Tom Kahn and the Fight for Democracy: A Political Portrait and Personal Recollection”, Dissent Magazine, pp. 238-239. http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d11Horowitz.pdf (Accessed 8 March 2010).

[79] Ibid., p. 209.

[80] Ibid. p 211.

[81] Ibid., p. 234.

[82] Ibid., p. 235.

[83] Ibid., p. 246.

[84] ‘About NED’, National Endowment for Democracy, http://www.ned.org/about (accessed 7 March 2010).

[85] David Lowe, ‘Idea to Reality: NED at 25: Reauthorization’, NED, http://www.ned.org/about/history (accessed 7 March 2010).

 


Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2013/02/trotsky-stalin-and-the-cold-war/

URLs in this post:

[1] Image: http://www.counter-currents.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/trotsky2.jpg

[2] Stalin: The Enduring Legacy: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1908476443/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=1908476443&linkCode=as2&tag=countercurren-20

[3] http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html

[4] http://www.wsws.org/exhibits/trotsky/trlect.htm: http://www.wsws.org/exhibits/trotsky/trlect.htm

[5] http://www.marxists.org/archive/shachtma/intro.htm: http://www.marxists.org/archive/shachtma/intro.htm

[6] http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/revhist/backiss/vol1/no1/glotzer.html: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/revhist/backiss/vol1/no1/glotzer.html

[7] http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/socialistvoice/natalia38.html: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/socialistvoice/natalia38.html

[8] http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/jefflect.html: http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/jefflect.html

[9] http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=699&loc=r: http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=699&loc=r

[10] http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d11Khan.pdf: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d11Khan.pdf

mardi, 03 janvier 2012

Modern art was CIA 'weapon'

pollock.key.jpg

Modern art was CIA 'weapon'

Revealed: how the spy agency used unwitting artists such as Pollock and de Kooning in a cultural Cold War

Ex: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

For decades in art circles it was either a rumour or a joke, but now it is confirmed as a fact. The Central Intelligence Agency used American modern art - including the works of such artists as Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell, Willem de Kooning and Mark Rothko - as a weapon in the Cold War. In the manner of a Renaissance prince - except that it acted secretly - the CIA fostered and promoted American Abstract Expressionist painting around the world for more than 20 years.

The connection is improbable. This was a period, in the 1950s and 1960s, when the great majority of Americans disliked or even despised modern art - President Truman summed up the popular view when he said: "If that's art, then I'm a Hottentot." As for the artists themselves, many were ex- com- munists barely acceptable in the America of the McCarthyite era, and certainly not the sort of people normally likely to receive US government backing.

Why did the CIA support them? Because in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union, this new artistic movement could be held up as proof of the creativity, the intellectual freedom, and the cultural power of the US. Russian art, strapped into the communist ideological straitjacket, could not compete.

The existence of this policy, rumoured and disputed for many years, has now been confirmed for the first time by former CIA officials. Unknown to the artists, the new American art was secretly promoted under a policy known as the "long leash" - arrangements similar in some ways to the indirect CIA backing of the journal Encounter, edited by Stephen Spender.

The decision to include culture and art in the US Cold War arsenal was taken as soon as the CIA was founded in 1947. Dismayed at the appeal communism still had for many intellectuals and artists in the West, the new agency set up a division, the Propaganda Assets Inventory, which at its peak could influence more than 800 newspapers, magazines and public information organisations. They joked that it was like a Wurlitzer jukebox: when the CIA pushed a button it could hear whatever tune it wanted playing across the world.

The next key step came in 1950, when the International Organisations Division (IOD) was set up under Tom Braden. It was this office which subsidised the animated version of George Orwell's Animal Farm, which sponsored American jazz artists, opera recitals, the Boston Symphony Orchestra's international touring programme. Its agents were placed in the film industry, in publishing houses, even as travel writers for the celebrated Fodor guides. And, we now know, it promoted America's anarchic avant-garde movement, Abstract Expressionism.

Initially, more open attempts were made to support the new American art. In 1947 the State Department organised and paid for a touring international exhibition entitled "Advancing American Art", with the aim of rebutting Soviet suggestions that America was a cultural desert. But the show caused outrage at home, prompting Truman to make his Hottentot remark and one bitter congressman to declare: "I am just a dumb American who pays taxes for this kind of trash." The tour had to be cancelled.

The US government now faced a dilemma. This philistinism, combined with Joseph McCarthy's hysterical denunciations of all that was avant-garde or unorthodox, was deeply embarrassing. It discredited the idea that America was a sophisticated, culturally rich democracy. It also prevented the US government from consolidating the shift in cultural supremacy from Paris to New York since the 1930s. To resolve this dilemma, the CIA was brought in.

The connection is not quite as odd as it might appear. At this time the new agency, staffed mainly by Yale and Harvard graduates, many of whom collected art and wrote novels in their spare time, was a haven of liberalism when compared with a political world dominated by McCarthy or with J Edgar Hoover's FBI. If any official institution was in a position to celebrate the collection of Leninists, Trotskyites and heavy drinkers that made up the New York School, it was the CIA.

Until now there has been no first-hand evidence to prove that this connection was made, but for the first time a former case officer, Donald Jameson, has broken the silence. Yes, he says, the agency saw Abstract Expressionism as an opportunity, and yes, it ran with it.

"Regarding Abstract Expressionism, I'd love to be able to say that the CIA invented it just to see what happens in New York and downtown SoHo tomorrow!" he joked. "But I think that what we did really was to recognise the difference. It was recognised that Abstract Expression- ism was the kind of art that made Socialist Realism look even more stylised and more rigid and confined than it was. And that relationship was exploited in some of the exhibitions.

"In a way our understanding was helped because Moscow in those days was very vicious in its denunciation of any kind of non-conformity to its own very rigid patterns. And so one could quite adequately and accurately reason that anything they criticised that much and that heavy- handedly was worth support one way or another."

To pursue its underground interest in America's lefty avant-garde, the CIA had to be sure its patronage could not be discovered. "Matters of this sort could only have been done at two or three removes," Mr Jameson explained, "so that there wouldn't be any question of having to clear Jackson Pollock, for example, or do anything that would involve these people in the organisation. And it couldn't have been any closer, because most of them were people who had very little respect for the government, in particular, and certainly none for the CIA. If you had to use people who considered themselves one way or another to be closer to Moscow than to Washington, well, so much the better perhaps."

This was the "long leash". The centrepiece of the CIA campaign became the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a vast jamboree of intellectuals, writers, historians, poets, and artists which was set up with CIA funds in 1950 and run by a CIA agent. It was the beach-head from which culture could be defended against the attacks of Moscow and its "fellow travellers" in the West. At its height, it had offices in 35 countries and published more than two dozen magazines, including Encounter.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom also gave the CIA the ideal front to promote its covert interest in Abstract Expressionism. It would be the official sponsor of touring exhibitions; its magazines would provide useful platforms for critics favourable to the new American painting; and no one, the artists included, would be any the wiser.

This organisation put together several exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism during the 1950s. One of the most significant, "The New American Painting", visited every big European city in 1958-59. Other influential shows included "Modern Art in the United States" (1955) and "Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century" (1952).

Because Abstract Expressionism was expensive to move around and exhibit, millionaires and museums were called into play. Pre-eminent among these was Nelson Rockefeller, whose mother had co-founded the Museum of Modern Art in New York. As president of what he called "Mummy's museum", Rockefeller was one of the biggest backers of Abstract Expressionism (which he called "free enterprise painting"). His museum was contracted to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to organise and curate most of its important art shows.

The museum was also linked to the CIA by several other bridges. William Paley, the president of CBS broadcasting and a founding father of the CIA, sat on the members' board of the museum's International Programme. John Hay Whitney, who had served in the agency's wartime predecessor, the OSS, was its chairman. And Tom Braden, first chief of the CIA's International Organisations Division, was executive secretary of the museum in 1949.

Now in his eighties, Mr Braden lives in Woodbridge, Virginia, in a house packed with Abstract Expressionist works and guarded by enormous Alsatians. He explained the purpose of the IOD.

"We wanted to unite all the people who were writers, who were musicians, who were artists, to demonstrate that the West and the United States was devoted to freedom of expression and to intellectual achievement, without any rigid barriers as to what you must write, and what you must say, and what you must do, and what you must paint, which was what was going on in the Soviet Union. I think it was the most important division that the agency had, and I think that it played an enormous role in the Cold War."

He confirmed that his division had acted secretly because of the public hostility to the avant-garde: "It was very difficult to get Congress to go along with some of the things we wanted to do - send art abroad, send symphonies abroad, publish magazines abroad. That's one of the reasons it had to be done covertly. It had to be a secret. In order to encourage openness we had to be secret."

If this meant playing pope to this century's Michelangelos, well, all the better: "It takes a pope or somebody with a lot of money to recognise art and to support it," Mr Braden said. "And after many centuries people say, 'Oh look! the Sistine Chapel, the most beautiful creation on Earth!' It's a problem that civilisation has faced ever since the first artist and the first millionaire or pope who supported him. And yet if it hadn't been for the multi-millionaires or the popes, we wouldn't have had the art."

Would Abstract Expressionism have been the dominant art movement of the post-war years without this patronage? The answer is probably yes. Equally, it would be wrong to suggest that when you look at an Abstract Expressionist painting you are being duped by the CIA.

But look where this art ended up: in the marble halls of banks, in airports, in city halls, boardrooms and great galleries. For the Cold Warriors who promoted them, these paintings were a logo, a signature for their culture and system which they wanted to display everywhere that counted. They succeeded.

* The full story of the CIA and modern art is told in 'Hidden Hands' on Channel 4 next Sunday at 8pm. The first programme in the series is screened tonight. Frances Stonor Saunders is writing a book on the cultural Cold War.

Covert Operation

In 1958 the touring exhibition "The New American Painting", including works by Pollock, de Kooning, Motherwell and others, was on show in Paris. The Tate Gallery was keen to have it next, but could not afford to bring it over. Late in the day, an American millionaire and art lover, Julius Fleischmann, stepped in with the cash and the show was brought to London.

The money that Fleischmann provided, however, was not his but the CIA's. It came through a body called the Farfield Foundation, of which Fleischmann was president, but far from being a millionaire's charitable arm, the foundation was a secret conduit for CIA funds.

So, unknown to the Tate, the public or the artists, the exhibition was transferred to London at American taxpayers' expense to serve subtle Cold War propaganda purposes. A former CIA man, Tom Braden, described how such conduits as the Farfield Foundation were set up. "We would go to somebody in New York who was a well-known rich person and we would say, 'We want to set up a foundation.' We would tell him what we were trying to do and pledge him to secrecy, and he would say, 'Of course I'll do it,' and then you would publish a letterhead and his name would be on it and there would be a foundation. It was really a pretty simple device."

Julius Fleischmann was well placed for such a role. He sat on the board of the International Programme of the Museum of Modern Art in New York - as did several powerful figures close to the CIA.

lundi, 10 mai 2010

Prof. Dachitchev: Réponse à la "Lettre ouverte" des intellectuels occidentaux contre Poutine

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 2004

Prof. Dr. Viatcheslav DACHITCHEV:

Réponse à la “Lettre ouverte” des intellectuels occidentaux contre Poutine

 

Daschitschew.jpgLe Professeur Viatcheslav Dachitchev, historien et expert ès questions allemandes, a été l’un des principaux conseillers de Gorbatchev et l’avocat au Kremlin de la réunification allemande. Nous avons déjà eu l’occasion de publier des entretiens avec lui ou des extraits de ces meilleurs essais [ http://www.harrymagazine.com/200407/turquia.htm ; http://ch.altermedia.info/index.php?p=641#more-641 ; tous deux sur la question de l’adhésion turque à l’UE; “Gorbatchev et la réunification allemande” & “Le combat de Poutine contre les oligarques”, in “Au fil de l’épée”, recueil n°48, août 2003].

 

Aujourd’hui, le Prof. Dachitchev réagit à la “Lettre ouverte” des intellectuels occidentaux, dirigée contre le Président Vladimir Poutine, accusé de détruire la démocratie en Russie. Sans hésiter, le Prof. Dachitchev a pris la plume pour présenter des contre-arguments dans les colonnes de l’hebdomadaire nationaliste allemand, la “National-Zeitung”, qui paraît à Munich. L’objectif du professeur : réfuter les arguments fallacieux avancés par les politiciens américains et les intellectuels qui leur sont inféodés, dans cette “Lettre ouverte”, dont l’objectif est de déstabiliser Poutine et la Russie. Dachitchev part du principe que “déclencher une guerre terroriste en bonne et due forme contre la Russie” coïncide avec les élections américaines. La guerre de Tchétchénie, en effet, apporte à Washington plusieurs avantages stratégiques importants. La  machine propagandiste US peut ainsi détourner l’attention de l’opinion publique internationale de l’expansionnisme américain en acte et accuser les seuls dirigeants russes d’enfreindre les droits de l’homme. La situation actuelle de la Russie est peu enviable, parce qu’elle sort à grand peine du marasme dans lequel la politique américaine l’a plongée, en pariant systématiquement sur le clan d’Eltsine. Voici la première partie de la réfutation rédigée par le Prof. Dachitchev :

 

Prélude à une nouvelle “Guerre Froide”?

 

L’élite dirigeante aux Etats-Unis a besoin d’une Russie faible, qui, comme beaucoup d’autres pays européens, puisse être maintenue à la remorque de Washington. Elle craint aussi de perdre sa “cinquième colonne” en Russie. Le 29 septembre dernier, 115 “intellectuels” et politiciens américains et européens ont publié une “Lettre ouverte” aux chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement de l’UE  et de l’OTAN (pourquoi pas aux Nations Unies?) qui constitue de facto une attaque agressive contre le gouvernement du Président Poutine. Comment faut-il interpréter cette lettre? Quels sont les objectifs poursuivis par sa diffusion?

 

Avant toute chose, cette lettre témoigne que la politique américaine vise encore et toujours à affaiblir la Russie. La façon dont la “Lettre” décrit la politique du Président Poutine, surtout après les événements de Beslan en Ossétie, n’est rien d’autre qu’une démolition en règle. Pour washington, ce qui importe, c’est d’organiser une campagne propagandiste visant à refaire de la Russie un ennemi pour l’opinion publique américaine et européenne, afin de pouvoir exercer une pression constante sur les plans politique, économique et militaire et de pouvoir la justifier.  Ou bien est-ce carrément le début d’une nouvelle “Guerre Froide” contre le “Super-Etat voyou”?

 

Les néo-conservateurs tirent les ficelles

 

Personne, et encore moins Poutine, ne conteste le fait qu’une véritable démocratie serait un bien pour la Russie. Cependant, les signataires de cette “Lettre ouverte” devraient surtout penser à l’essentiel; et cet essentiel n’est-il  pas, aujourd’hui, pour la communauté internationale, d’éviter une nouvelle guerre mondiale, qui pourrait se déclencher à la suite de la politique américaine qui vise à établir une hégémonie globale? Mais il serait naïf de croire que les signataires veulent vraiment éviter cette conflagration universelle. Car, parmi ceux qui ont initié et signé cette “Lettre”, on trouve les tireurs de ficelles néo-conservateurs  comme William Kristol et Robert Kagan, tous deux fondateurs du “Projet pour un nouveau siècle américain”, expression de leur lobby idéologique.

 

En Russie aussi, une campagne  hystérique contre Poutine est menée tambour battant, justement par les mêmes cercles et cénacles qui, sous Eltsine, avaient ruiné et pillé le pays et le peuple. Ils craignent aujourd’hui de perdre tout pouvoir et toute influence. Ils se sont rassemblés au sein de  “Comité 2008” et d’une “Fédération des forces justes”. Leur objectif consiste à renverser Poutine. Ils font dans la pure démagogie et rendent le Président responsable indirectement du massacre effroyable de Beslan. Ils posent ses réformes du système politique russe comme une volonté de réduire les droits de l’homme à rien. Pourtant, malgré leurs cris, ils oublient de se soucier du problème majeur de la Russie d’aujourd’hui : 41% de la population russe végètent sous le seuil de la pauvreté ou l’avoisinnent dangereusement. Pour Alexandre Lifschitz  —l’ancien ministre des finances d’Elstsine—  ces millions de pauvres gens sont des “alluvions sociaux”. Pour Andreï Piontkovski  —un russophobe bien connu—  le Président Poutine est le “problème majeur” de la Russie. Le politologue Satarov, qui appartient lui aussi à l’entourage d’Eltsine et dont le nom sert à désigner le péché actuel de l’intelligentsia russe (on parle de “saratovisme”), prétend avoir trouvé les moyens de “freiner Poutine”. Ainsi, la tragédie de Beslan a contribué à faire reconnaître ceux qui sont en faveur et ceux qui sont en défaveur des intérêts nationaux de la Russie.

 

Les dangers pour la Russie

 

C’est quelque part exact : l’action terroriste abominable qui a été perpétrée à Beslan en Ossétie a épouvanté le monde entier et a permis à la caste dirigeante russe, rassemblée autour de Poutine, de procéder à une appréciation nouvelle des dangers et des défis qui menacent la Russie. Il est exact de dire aussi que l’affaire de Beslan provoquera une transformation essentielle dans la politique russe, sur les plans de la politique intérieure, de la politique extérieure et de la politique militaire.

 

Après la fin officielle et formelle de la “Guerre Froide”, la Russie avait réduit ses budgets militaires de manière spectaculaire : le chiffre était passé de 200 milliards à 12 milliards de dollars. Les budgets américains, en revanche, avaient gonflé pour atteindre  des dimensions gigantesques et dépasser les chiffres du temps de la “Guerre Froide”. Vu la pression américaine, la Russie a dû tripler son budget militaire au cours de ces cinq dernières années. Les plans soumis en août dernier pour les dépenses militaires de 2005 prévoient une augmentation de 28% pour atteindre le chiffre de 573 milliards de roubles. Après l’action terroriste tchétchène de Beslan, ces budgets seront encore augmentés. Selon des déclarations officielles, une bonne part de ce budget devra assurer la parité avec les Etats-Unis en matière de fusées nucléaires.

 

Pourquoi ? Parce que le facteur qui pèse le plus sur la Russie depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, sur les plans géopolitique, géostratégique et géo-économique est indubitablement la politique américaine. Après le démontage du système totalitaire soviétique, après que Gorbatchev ait renoncé définitivement au messianisme communiste et à sa politique hégémoniste, après l’effondrement de l’Union Soviétique, on a pu croire que les tensions entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie disparaîtraient et qu’une situation nouvelle naîtrait, apportant dans son sillage les conditions d’une paix durable et d’une vision constructive de la politique internationale. En réalité, rien de tout cela n’est advenu, bien au contraire !

 

Le programme : bétonner l’hégémonie définitive des Etats-Unis  sur le globe

 

La Doctrine Bush a pour assises les programmes géopolitiques visant à bétonner l’hégémonie définitive des Etats-Unis sur le globe. Ces programmes dérivent du “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC), élaboré au printemps de l’année 1997, et d’autres projets émanant des centres de réflexion néo-conservateurs.

 

Quelques mois après l’élaboration de ce PNAC, est paru un article dans la revue “Foreign Affairs”, qui s’intitulait : “Pour une géostratégie eurasiatique”. Il était dû à la plume de Zbigniew Brzezinski et révélait ouvertement et sans vergogne les  plans américains. C’est-à-dire les suivants:

è    Les Etats-Unis doivent devenir la seule et unique puissance dirigeante en Eurasie. Car qui possède l’Eurasie possède aussi l’Afrique.

è    La tâche principale de cette politique globale des Etats-Unis consiste à élargir leur principale “tremplin” géostratégique en Europe, en poussant les pions, que sont l’OTAN et l’UE, aussi loin que possible vers l’Est, y compris aux Pays baltes et à l’Ukraine.

è    Il faut empêcher toute bonne intégration au sein même de l’UE, de manière à ce que celle-ci ne  puisse pas devenir une puissance mondiale à part entière.

è    L’Allemagne  —qui sert de base à l’hégémonie américaine en Europe—  ne pourra jamais devenir une puissance mondiale; son rôle doit être limité à des dimensions strictement régionales.

è    La Chine  —soit l’”ancrage asiatique” de la stratégie euro-asiatique des Etats-Unis, doit, elle aussi, demeurer une simple puissance régionale.

è    La Russie doit être éliminée en tant que grande puissance eurasienne; à sa place, il faut créer une confédération d’Etats mineurs, qui seront la république de Russie d’Europe, la république sibérienne et la république d’Extrême Orient.

 

On le constate : les objectifs géopolitiques des Etats-Unis mènent tout droit à un télescopage pur et simple entre les intérêts russe et ceux de Washington.

 

Viatcheslav DACHITCHEV,

Moscou.

[article paru dans la “National-Zeitung”, n°42, 8 octobre 2004].

jeudi, 11 mars 2010

Le réveil du Vieux Monde

Archives de SYNERGIES EUROPEENNES - 1990

Le réveil du Vieux Monde

par Louis SOREL

 

L'édifice diplomatico-stratégique s'écroule et l'Etablissement politique et médiatique n'en finit pas de jouer les prolongations. Ainsi, Thierry de Montbrial, docteur de l'IFRI, prêche le statu quo quand celui-ci n'existe plus, et Jacques Attali, sous couvert de prospective, fait dans le millénarisme soft  (1). C'est donc avec bonheur que nous avons lu le dernier ouvrage de William Pfaff, Le réveil du Vieux Monde. Citoyen américain de souche rhénane, vivant à Paris, William Pfaff développe avec finesse et objectivité ses analyses sur l'ordre international de l'après-guerre. Son diagnostic est sévère et lucide: les héros (Etats-Unis et URSS) sont fatigués et les fissures du monde bipolaire laissent entrevoir un possible retour à la primauté pluriséculaire de l'Europe.

 

indexooooooo.jpgC'est à travers l'analyse de l'évolution conjointe des forces militaires et des ressources économiques des principaux Etats que Paul Kennedy affirme inéluctable le déclin américain (2). Refusant ce primat de l'économique, William Pfaff met en exergue la pluralité des facteurs à l'œuvre dans la genèse de toute configuration historique et l'importance qu'il accorde au substrat culturel l'amène à rejeter l'historicisme linéaire de l'idéologie dominante: «Elles (les sociétés non occidentales) se trouvent ailleurs et sont les héritières d'un passé différent. Et il n'est pas totalement déraisonnable de penser qu'elles puissent avoir un avenir différent». A l'égard de l'histoire la plus immédiate, l'auteur, s'il évoque l'éventuelle responsabilité de l'Allemagne dans le déclenchement de la guerre civile européenne, ne s'en tient pas à la condamnation morale d'un fascisme a-temporel. Le second conflit mondial ne saurait s'expliquer par l'irruption du Malin dans le monde, et si césure il y a, c'est en 1914 que l'Europe, jusqu'alors robe sans coutures, se déchire. En 1917, débarquent les troupes américaines alors que la révolution bolchévique, "traumatisme politique" initial, met fin à l'homogénéité d'une société internationale longtemps eurocentrée. Le système Est-Ouest émerge (dialectique du bolchévisme et de l'anti-bolchévisme), le stalinisme et l'hitlérisme, incarnations de la révolution et de la contre-révolution, recourant aux formes et au symbolisme du système de guerre. Le phénomène totalitaire s'enracinant dans cette époque particulière, anti-fascisme et anti-communisme n'apportent aujourd'hui aucun cadre d'analyse satisfaisant (3).

 

Le «siècle américain» n'a pas

duré cinquante ans...

 

Quarante-cinq années après la clôture de cette guerre de trente ans, la bi-hégémonie américano-soviétique est remise en cause. «Le siècle américain n'aura pas duré cinquante ans» et W. Pfaff fait de l'idéologie américaine la cause majeure des revers extérieurs. De l'isolationnisme de l'Age classique à l'internationalisme de l'après-guerre, la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis se fonde en effet sur la présomption de supériorité morale; qu'il s'agisse de se préserver de ce monde corrompu ou de le convertir, avec pour postulat tacite de Washington à Bush: «L'Amérique ne serait en lieu sûr dans le monde que le jour où le monde lui ressemblerait d'assez près» (4).

 

Ce messianisme à base de calvinisme et de libéralisme n'a cessé de se heurter à la force des choses. L'Amérique s'est enthousiasmée pour les «Etats-Unis d'Europe» mais depuis le guerre commerciale fait rage et l'insipide technocrate qu'est Jacques Delors se surprend à hausser le ton! L'Amérique a cru l'Asie plus docile et ouverte à son influence  mais elle n'en finit pas d'exorciser le spectre du Vietnam!

 

Et pourtant, le vieux vocabulaire de l'exceptionalisme américain persiste, faute d'autre philosophie politique: «Mise au défi de repenser la politique en Amérique centrale, la Commission Kissinger, groupe de réflexion à dominante conservatrice qui remit son rapport en 1984, ne trouva rien de mieux à proposer qu'un ambitieux programme d'assistance pour aider les populations centre-américaines à faire leur la vision de l'avenir que représentent nos idéaux».

 

Parallèlement, les anciennes sociétés culturellement autonomes d'Europe centrale et d'Eurasie auront survécu à la puissance soviétique et démontrent le caractère inéluctablement transitoire du communisme. Cette volonté de faire table rase du passé a généré la situation d'insécurité permanente de l'URSS.

 

Aujourd'hui l'Amérique souffre d'hypertrophie impériale et invoquer les mânes des Founding Fathers  ne conjurera pas le déclin. De même, le retour de Lénine prôné par Gorbatchev ne peut légitimer un système à bout de souffle (5). Ironie de l'histoire, «de cette révolution, il (Gorbatchev) pourrait bien être le Kérenski!». La rétraction des deux protagonistes du jeu politique mondial n'est pas sans risques, mais la fin du «siècle américain» débouche sur un nouveau «siècle européen». De fait, le thème récurrent du Pacifique, Méditerranée du XXIième siècle, a pu dominer l'orée des années 80, la remarquable réussite d'un Japon fondamentalement autre n'a pas valeur paradigmatique, W. Pfaff se montrant circonspect quant à l'éveil de la Chine, tant la vigueur des cultures de frontière fait défaut à la civilisation centrale (6). Demeure donc au centre du monde l'Europe, dont le partage était l'enjeu de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis ne pouvant s'en abstraire sans renoncer à la puissance.

 

Quelles destinées pour

la Grande Europe...?

 

«Lorsque le maître de la mer dispose d'un pareil atterrage, écrit Georges Buis, il ne le lâche pas». De bon gré, ajouterions-nous. Un temps déclassée mais bénéficiant des plus formidables antécédents historiques, «l'Europe pourrait même à l'avenir compter davantage que les Etats-Unis». Ecrivant ces lignes avant le jeu de domino de l'automne 1989, l'auteur n'envisage alors que le seul sort de la CEE; avec la fermeture de la parenthèse soviétique, les destinées de la Grande Europe sont manifestement autres que celles des Etats-Unis.

 

«Depuis la fin de la guerre, le privilège de l'irresponsabilité a été la qualité saillante de la situation en Europe» et, après quarante années de statu quo, l'espace paneuropéen est à organiser, la question centrale étant l'avenir de l'URSS. Constatant que l'occupation du glacis centre-européen n'a pu assurer la sécurité de l'Etat soviétique, W. Pfaff estime possible et nécessaire un arrangement russo-européen fondé sur la claire conscience du coût prohibitif et de l'irrationalité politique de toute nouvelle guerre en Europe. A cette fin, il réhabilite le statut de la Finlande acquis à la pointe de l'épée et injustement dénigré. «La vieille peur de la Russie, consciente de sa faiblesse et de son arriération, a toujours été la peur de l'encerclement», la neutralisation de l'Europe centrale pourrait l'en affranchir.

 

La guerre froide terminée, W. Pfaff n'entonne pas pour autant un Te Deum.  Au terme d'une aventure politique et morale qui a commencé avec le voyage de Lénine dans un fourgon scellé, les étoiles sont mortes (intitulé du premier chapitre). «L'Amérique fut un empire éphémère» et l'Europe reste «le nœud de l'histoire contemporaine». L'histoire nous offre une page blanche: «L'aventure léniniste est terminée. La question capitale demeure: qu'est-ce qui a commencé?».

 

Louis SOREL.

 

William PFAFF, Le réveil du Vieux Monde. Vers un nouvel ordre international, Calmann-Lévy, 1990, 130 FF.

 

Notes

 

(1) Dans le Figaro  du 5 octobre 1989, Thierry de Montbrial prétend vouloir favoriser leur (les peuples de l'Europe de l'Est) affranchissement de l'impérialisme soviétique, mais «sans bouleverser l'équilibre européen, car nous ne serions certainement pas prêts à en assumer les risques». Jacques Attali, pseudo-futurologue, prédit dans Signes d'horizon  (Fayard, 1989) la fin de la crise par la généralisation de l'ordre marchand, un mode de vie universel, le triomphe de l'individu et du nomadisme...». Voir également John Naisbitt, Méga-tendances - 1990-2000 (éd. First).

(2) Cf. Paul Kennedy, Naissance et déclin des grandes puissances, Payot, Paris, 1989. Cfr. Vouloir  n°50/51. La version originale a suscité un important débat aux Etats-Unis.

(3) cf. Alain de Benoist, «Pensée politique: l'implosion», in Krisis,  n°1, 1989.

(4) Sur la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis, voir Bernard Boëne, «La stratégie générale des Etats-Unis ou le jeu sans fin (?) de l'idéologie et du réalisme», in Stratégique,  n°39/1988. Et l'essai de Michel Jobert, Les Américains  (Albin Michel, 1987).

La prégnance de l'American Creed  depuis deux siècles explique l'aspect "croisade messianique" et les caractères anti-clausewitziens des guerres américaines: les objectifs poursuivis  -la capitulation sans condition de l'adversaire-  et les moyens mis en œuvre sont disproportionnés par rapport aux enjeux initiaux.

(5) Contre la thèse aronienne du projet humanitaire dévoyé par Staline, lire Dominique Colas, Lénine et le léninisme,  PUF, 1987. L'auteur y démontre avec rigueur le caractère intrinsèquement totalitaire du léninisme.

(6) W. Pfaff se réfère à Arnold Toynbee dont l'ouvrage majeur, L'Histoire  (Bordas, 1981) a été recensé par Ange Sampieru dans Vouloir  n°50/51.

samedi, 30 janvier 2010

Histoire et actualité de la guerre froide

Histoire et actualité de la guerre froide

http://unitepopulaire.org/

« Pour beaucoup d’étudiants, la Guerre froide aujourd’hui n’évoque rien de personnel. Cela apparaît presque comme de l’Histoire ancienne.
En réalité, malgré des changements aussi radicaux que l’effondrement de l’Union soviétique et la réunification allemande, plusieurs problèmes, qui existaient avant 1989, sont toujours là. […]

guerrefroidesssss.jpgPeu après 1989, on pensait que le monde libre et la démocratie avaient triomphé grâce à la victoire des Etats-Unis sur l’Union soviétique. La réalité de 2009 est différente. Le modèle démocratique américain ne s’est de loin pas imposé partout à travers le globe. […] Dans la politique américaine, il y a des relents de Guerre froide. L’attitude de Washington par rapport à Cuba n’a pas fondamentalement changé. L’embargo imposé à La Havane en 1962 est toujours en vigueur. […]

Pour beaucoup de politiciens, la Guerre froide était pratique; elle permettait d’expliquer à son opinion publique de manière simpliste que tout était soit noir, soit blanc. Le monde est beaucoup plus complexe que ne le décrivait à l’époque Fukuyama. L’Histoire n’est pas un processus linéaire. Il n’y a pas de happy end hollywoodien une fois pour toutes. Il s’est agi d’une théorie très ethnocentrique et très offensante. Une manière de dire que la civilisation occidentale a triomphé. C’est une attitude dangereuse qui a poussé l’Occident à humilier la Russie dans les années 1990. Ce n’est pas un hasard si Vladimir Poutine a, en réaction, mené une politique agressive et nationaliste, qui a pu choquer. Une politique qui était, il est vrai, aussi teintée d’une nostalgie du statut de superpuissance qu’avait l’Union soviétique. […] Après la disparition du Pacte de Varsovie, certains pensaient que l’OTAN allait aussi disparaître. Elle a non seulement survécu, elle s’est même étendue. La Russie a vécu cela comme une continuation de la Guerre froide. […]

Le monde multipolaire est devenu une réalité. Ce n’était pas le cas avant 1989. Mais j’aimerais corriger un cliché de la Guerre froide. On l’a présentée comme un monde bipolaire simple. Elle était pourtant beaucoup plus complexe. La Chine par exemple n’a pas toujours joué le jeu bipolaire. L’Inde et les non-alignés non plus. Au Moyen-Orient, la Guerre froide n’était de loin pas le principal facteur de division. […]

Il faut se rappeler qu’au faîte de la Guerre froide les Etats-Unis soutenaient les “combattants de la liberté”, les mouvements rebelles contre les Soviétiques qui venaient d’envahir l’Afghanistan en 1979. Mais aussi les Contras au Nicaragua, l’Unita en Angola. Ces soutiens ont provoqué un retour de flamme. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux Etats-Unis en sont une illustration. Cet événement a fortement changé la donne. Après le fiasco des années 1990, comme en Somalie, les Etats-Unis n’auraient jamais pu lancer des opérations militaires de grande échelle en Afghanistan avec l’appui de l’opinion publique sans de tels attentats. Cette période a toutefois des similitudes avec les débuts de la Guerre froide, avec le maccarthysme des années 1940-1950. Dans une démocratie comme les Etats-Unis, tout avis dissident, à partir de 2001, équivalait à une trahison. »

 

Jussi Hanhimäki, professeur à l’IHEID, interviewé par Le Temps, 3 novembre 2009

mercredi, 03 juin 2009

A propos des accords Reagan/Gorbatchev

 

Reagan_and_Gorbachev_signing.jpg

 

 

 

SYNERGIES EUROPÉENNES - Juin 1988

 

 

 

A propos des accords Reagan-Gorbatchev

 

 

par Jean-Rémy Vanderlooven

 

 

La récente signature, en décembre dernier, du traité américano-soviétique portant sur une réduction des euro-missiles a fait couler beaucoup d'encre. La ren-contre à Moscou de Reagan et de Gorbatchev prouve en tout cas que cet accord est durable. Enfin un évé-nement médiatique qui ne soit sucité ni par une catastrophe ni par un scandale?

 

 

Bien que le traité, désormais ratifié par le Congrès américain, ne concerne que 3 à 7% de la puissance de feu nucléaire des deux super-puissances, réactions et com-mentaires ont fusés en tous sens.

 

Certains en ont déduit, hâtivement sans doute, que Reagan et Gorbatchev s'étaient soudain convertis au pacifisme angélique, d'autres y ont trouvé une preu-ve supplémentaire du machiavélisme soviétique, et quelques-uns, enfin, sont partis en quête d'un para-pluie, pas trop troué, sous lequel se réfugier frileu-sement. Toutes ces gesticulations révèlent un double manque considérable: la lucidité et la dignité.

 

 

En fait, la signature de ce traité trouve sa véritable im-portance historique, en tant que signe d'une dou-ble modification d'analyse et de stratégie dans le chef des deux grands et "subsidiairement" du statut de l'Europe de l'Ouest.

 

 

USA

 

 

Depuis quelques années, la stratégie mondiale des E-tats-Unis se réoriente en fonction de deux éléments re-lativement neufs. D'une part, une résurgence de la tentation isolationniste. Celle-ci est illustrée, au plan économique, par les différentes "guerres" euro-amé-ricaines (aciers, pâtes, etc.), ou encore, par la dégringolade —voulue— du dollar sur toutes les pla-ces financières, ce qui a pour double effet de faire fi-nancer la démagogie reaganienne par le reste du mon--de et d'élever des barrières autour du marché in-térieur américain. Parallèlement, au plan militaire, l'IDS ne sanctuarise que le territoire américain.

 

 

D'autre part, la source de la vitalité américaine glisse de la côte Est vers la côte Ouest, recentrage motivé par le transfert du centre de gravité économique de l'At-lantique-Nord au Pacifique. Cette double con-train-te, à laquelle s'ajoute au relatif manque de "fia-bi-lité" des alliés de l'OTAN, conduit, dans la pensée stratégique américaine, à une marginalisation toujours plus marquée de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Un désengagement progressif des Américains en Europe est donc de plus en plus probable.

 

 

URSS

 

 

En ce qui concerne l'URSS, il serait temps d'aban-donner nos phantasmes concernant une quelconque volonté de démocratisation de type "occidentalo-libéral". La nouvelle direction du pays a relevé un dé-fi d'une toute autre nature: la modernisation d'un sys-tème économique obsolète, condition de survie de l'empire. Cette exigence détermine le choix de nou-velles priorités: la société civile et l'infrastructure économique/technologique prennent, momentané-ment (?), le pas sur la logique d'un impérialisme pu-rement militaire et sur son corrolaire, la course aux armements.

 

Cette réorientation fondamentale devra permettre à la fois le transfert de ressources financières et humai-nes à l'intérieur de l'URSS et, via une amélioration du "look" diplomatique, une meilleure collaboration avec le reste du monde. Si tout ceci peut se traduire par une moindre militarisation de la société sovié-ti-que, par une relative décentralisation du pouvoir et par un assouplissement des normes de commu-nica-tion et d'information, l'Union Soviétique restera mal-gré tout fort éloignée d'un quelconque "plura-lis-me".

 

 

Les indices de ce changement de stratégie ne man-quent pas; l'URSS s'est longtemps montrée très ac-ti-ve dans le monde par ses interventions militaires, sou-vent massives. Dans les pays d'Europe centrale, à Cuba, au Vietnam, en Angola, en Ethiopie, en Af-gha-nistan (ces entreprises ont d'ailleurs eu pour effet d'atténuer le complexe d'"assiégés" des dirigeants so-viétiques).

 

Or, plus récemment, un relatif désengagement est per-ceptible, illustré, par exemple, par une aide plus dis-crète au Nicaragua, par la non-intervention directe en Pologne, par les velléités de retrait d'Afghanistan ou encore par le traité sur les euromissiles.

 

 

Tout cela rend l'étouffement complet des satellites eu-ropéens moins impératif et diminue l'acuité de l'af-frontement avec les nations ouest-européennes.

 

 

Europe de l'Ouest

 

 

Les Européens de l'Ouest ne peuvent nullement es-pé-rer imposer une stratégie propre et volontariste dans le cadre de ces bouleversements.

 

 

En effet, du fait des conséquences de ses guerres ci-viles et des erreurs historiques qui ont jalonné les po-litiques de colonisation puis de décolonisation, l'Europe a dû renoncer à son rôle de leader mondial. Cependant, les atouts qu'elle conserve, doivent lui permettre de développer une tactique "opportuniste" en fonction du relatif espace d'autonomie qui s'offre à elle.

 

 

Cette tactique devrait s'articuler sur trois options fon-damentales: 1) le neutralisme (non-alignement idéo-logique par rapport aux deux super-puissances; ce que les Allemands nomment plus justement la Blockfreiheit);  2) le recentrage et 3) la redécouverte de ces axes naturels de collaboration internationale.

 

 

Neutralisme

 

 

"Plutôt rouge que mort?". Certainement pas: une tel-le attitude n'est qu'une façon, parmi d'autres, de sa-crifier, une fois de plus, l'essentiel: la dignité. En fait, le nouveau neutralisme dont ont besoin le centre et l'ouest de notre continent est la première condition de son indépendance: il s'agit de s'affranchir de la tu-telle exercée par les deux grands, tutelle qui n'apporte qu'une protection illusoire au prix d'une vassalisation bien réelle. Dans cette optique, tant l'iso-la-tionnisme américain que l'attitude nouvelle des Soviétiques à l'égard du glacis est-européen sont des opportunités qui ne peuvent être négligées.

 

 

Recentrage

 

 

Au-delà de cette neutralité réinventée, l'espace euro-péen ainsi créé ne pourra définir son identité et affir-mer sa vocation internationale qu'en faisant appel à un système de références et de projets se rapportant à lui-même.

 

 

Potentiels culturels et traditions politiques purement européens sont, en effet, appelés à former la base d'une vision prospective de notre devenir, par la mi-se en avant de la communauté de destin de nos peu-ples. Nous voilà bien éloigné du "grand marché" pu-rement mercantile et ouvert à tous vents que nous proposent nos technocrates...

 

 

Axes d'ouverture

 

 

Contrairement aux dires des farfelus du mondialisme militant, l'avenir international de l'Europe ne passe pas par Séoul ou Lima, lieux pour nous excentri-ques, appartenant à l'espace sud- ou nord-pacifique.

 

 

Notre histoire indique à suffisance les solidarités (et les interdépendances) naturelles qui devraient être ré-ac-tualisées: l'axe est-ouest d'une part, l'axe nord-sud d'autre part.

 

Les conditions d'émergence du premier axe ont été dé-veloppées dans le points précédent. En ce qui con-cerne le deuxième axe  —l'Afrique—  sa réalité est clairement inscrite dans les faits. Nombre de nos pro-blèmes parmi les plus concrets, comme l'immi-gration ou l'approvisionnement en énergie, par exemple, ne pourront être résolus que sur base d'un dialogue trans-méditerranéen.

 

 

Défis

 

 

Il s'agit donc, pour l'Europe, de relever un défi: re-constituer une identité européenne propre qu'il fau-dra concrétiser dans un espace autonome et inscrire dans une alternative internationale dynamique.

 

Au boulot,...

 

 

Jean-Rémy VANDERLOOVEN.

 

 

jeudi, 07 mai 2009

Democrazia e guerra fredda: anatomia di un paradosso

Democrazia e guerra fredda: anatomia di un paradosso


di Carlomanno Adinolfi - ex: http://augustomovimento.blogspot.com/


Con la fine della guerra mondiale “democrazia” sembra diventare la parola d’ordine per tutti gli Stati protagonisti della scena globale. “Democrazia” diventa il baluardo della modernità e dei popoli contro le “dittature” sconfitte con le armi dall’alleanza finanza-comunismo. Eppure “democrazia” diventa sempre di più una parola astratta a cui ognuno dà diversi significati a seconda talvolta della convenienza, talvolta della matrice culturale in cui essa nasce.
Nell’immediato dopoguerra, quando il mondo comincia ad assumere l’assetto deciso a Jalta dai cosiddetti “grandi” (Roosevelt, Stalin e il proclamatore dell’inizio delle belligeranze, Churchill) i principali modelli di democrazia diventano quello occidentale, di stampo parlamentare, e quello popolare, proprio dei regimi ad est della cortina di ferro.
Ovviamente i rappresentanti dei due modelli rivendicano ognuno la legittimità del definirsi “democratico”.

Le democrazie occidentali

I paesi cosiddetti occidentali, sotto la leadership militare, economica e politica degli Usa, sono tutti fautori di quelle che comunemente vengono definite democrazie parlamentari. Questi paesi ponevano e pongono tutt’ora come concetto cardine della loro democrazia le libertà individuali e la loro difesa in tutti i campi. In questa concezione la massima espressione di libertà è il voto per decidere i propri rappresentanti in parlamento e negli organi di governo territoriale.

Tuttavia il principio fondante di quella che dovrebbe essere una democrazia nel vero senso della parola, ossia “governo del popolo”, viene del tutto a mancare: la partecipazione stessa del popolo al governo e alla vita politica. La partecipazione attiva dei cittadini alla sfera politica nasce e si esaurisce all’interno delle urne nella scelta dei rappresentanti. Da quel momento in poi quella che dovrebbe essere res publica torna di fatto ad essere sfera privata degli eletti a “rappresentanti del popolo”. Se si va ad analizzare a fondo la realtà concreta, infatti, è evidente che solo una piccolissima percentuale della popolazione ha a che fare con la gestione effettiva della politica, e si prospetta una visione che sembra sempre più quella di una oligarchia, piuttosto che quella di una democrazia – visione che diviene sempre più accentuata man mano che i cosiddetti rappresentanti diventano sempre più legati alle lobbies economico-finanziarie.

Altro fattore che faceva degli Stati occidentali delle democrazie solo a parole è il fatto che (altro cardine del mondo occidentale) a vincere sia la cosiddetta maggioranza.
Nei paesi con una moltitudine di partiti nella scena politica, questo, di fatto, sta a significare che al governo, tranne in casi eccezionali, non vada affatto la rappresentanza della maggioranza dei cittadini, ma semplicemente i rappresentanti della minoranza più grande. Nei paesi a sistema proporzionale è poi necessario che queste “grandi minoranze” debbano allearsi con partiti teoricamente più vicini ideologicamente per raggiungere e mantenere il governo. Questo crea altri scenari paradossali con partiti che di fatto sono rappresentanti di una minima parte di cittadinanza che hanno il potere di ricatto politico verso i più grandi, e che possono in questo modo andare al governo a discapito di partiti ben più rappresentativi che si trovano però fuori dalla coalizione vincente.

L’unico caso in cui ad andare al governo è effettivamente la maggioranza, ossia chi si accaparra almeno un voto in più del 50% dei votanti, è quello dei sistemi bipolari in cui di fatto sono presenti solo due partiti ma, fuori dagli
Usa, un terzo conta sempre qualcosa, come accade in Germania o Inghilterra. Ma anche qui il paradosso è enorme, in quanto la totalità della popolazione deve per forza riconoscersi in uno dei due schieramenti.
In tutti i casi, comunque, chi raggiunge la cosiddetta maggioranza, sia essa relativa o assoluta, lascia di fatto esclusa dal governo una fetta enorme della popolazione, rendendo il termine “governo del popolo” del tutto inadatto a descrivere il sistema di governo occidentale.

Le democrazie popolari

Paradossalmente gli Stati che durante la guerra fredda si avvicinavano di più al concetto vero di democrazia erano proprio gli Stati sotto influenza sovietica, i quali avevano dalla loro le cosiddette democrazie popolari.

Facendo propria la considerazione di J. J. Rousseau (1712 – 1778), secondo cui la volontà di tutti (volonté générale) non coincide affatto con la somma delle singole volontà, queste democrazie cercarono di scardinare il sistema atomista, secondo cui ognuno deve promuovere i propri interessi a discapito di quelli dell’avversario sperando di andare al governo (o di esservi rappresentato) per veder così attuato il proprio programma personale o quello della propria fazione. Promossero pertanto un sistema che vedeva tutta la popolazione rappresentata da un unico partito: quello comunista.
In quest’ottica si cercò di reintrodurre il concetto di partecipazione attiva della popolazione alla politica, rendendo obbligatoria l’iscrizione al partito, vietando il più possibile la proprietà privata e rendendo, di conseguenza, tutto proprietà dello Stato, facendo sì che ogni lavoratore e ogni fabbrica lavorassero solo ed unicamente per il partito, in un’ottica che vedeva l’economia del tutto assoggettata al volere degli alti gradi del polit bureau che rappresentavano l’intera collettività.

Sebbene però questo sistema fosse, dal punto di vista teorico, più vicino al concetto di “governo del popolo” rispetto alla controparte occidentale, di fatto anche qui il popolo era del tutto estraneo non solo alle decisioni ma anche ai vantaggi del proprio lavoro. Essendo praticamente annullata la sfera individuale a discapito di quella collettiva, la politica economica attuata tramite i cosiddetti “piani quinquennali” non era affatto finalizzata al benessere economico e sociale dei lavoratori, ma piuttosto al benessere – appunto – dell’intera collettività, che – di fatto – era rappresentata dal partito e dallo Stato.

I paradossi dei due mondi

Abbiamo già visto il paradosso secondo cui sarebbe stato più corretto chiamare democrazie quelle popolari piuttosto che quelle occidentali.
Ma ci sono altri e ben più grandi paradossi nei due sistemi.
Nell’ottica sovietica appena trattata, secondo la quale l’individuo è annullato nella collettività, il lavoratore diventa un ingranaggio per il benessere dello Stato e non per se stesso, facendo un lavoro di cui non vedrà mai personalmente i frutti, economici o politici, andando a ricostruire esattamente lo scenario criticato dallo stesso Marx, e facendo dell’economia dei paesi sovietici praticamente un capitalismo di Stato.

Ma il paradosso più grande forse riguarda proprio il mondo occidentale. La volontà esplicita di liberare l’economia e la finanza dal controllo dello Stato favorì non solo l’assoggettarsi delle politiche nazionali alle logiche di mercato, ma soprattutto favorì la creazione e il proliferare di una classe finanziaria internazionale che cercò e riuscì a gestire le politiche nazionali per i propri fini. Questo fece sì che lobbies sovra e inter-nazionali potessero controllare i governi, e che Stati con assai poca sovranità nazionale potessero essere governati di fatto da rappresentanti di aziende o multinazionali straniere. A conti fatti, il mondo occidentale risultò quindi attuare perfettamente il concetto di internazionalismo che il comunismo russo invece aveva abbandonato fin dai tempi in cui Stalin estromise a picconate Trotsky, attuando invece un gigantesco nazionalismo al servizio della Grande Russia.

Il terrore come mezzo di auto-sostentamento dei due modelli

Il clima di guerra fredda che iniziò fin dalla fine della guerra mondiale di certo aiutò il consolidarsi dei due modelli, che furono comunque contrastati per una ventina d’anni dai paesi non-allineati, i quali facevano riferimento a leaders popolari e nazionali come l’egiziano Nasser e l’argentino Perón.

A est della cortina di ferro qualunque contatto con il mondo occidentale era vietato o fortemente “sconsigliato” per la difesa dell’utopia sovietica. Qualunque corrente non conforme a quella dominante di volta in volta nel politburo di Mosca era purgata con esecuzioni od omicidi politici, tacciata d’essere “reazionaria” o comunque “nemica del popolo”. Qualunque tentativo di indipendenza dall’influenza moscovita, o qualunque tentativo di riforma della classe politica anche solo verso il socialismo o la socialdemocrazia, era repressa nel sangue, come nei casi ben noti di Praga, Budapest o in Polonia.

Ma anche in Occidente si fece largo uso del terrore per mantenere lo status quo deciso a Jalta. Con il piano Marshall – di fatto – tutti i paesi europei divennero talmente legati alla politica statunitense, tanto da divenirne praticamente schiavi. Il quotidiano timore per l’imminente scoppio del conflitto nucleare costrinse gli Stati occidentali a fare quadrato dietro agli Usa, e ciò impedì di fatto qualunque forma di ricerca (o di ritorno) di una terza via, tanto politica quanto economica.

Non è un caso poi che le nazioni in cui si permise di avere fortissimi partiti comunisti fossero proprio i paesi più pericolosi per l’ottica che voleva l’Europa assoggettata politicamente ed economicamente: tolte la Germania divisa e l’Inghilterra, che si era già demolita con Churchill fin dagli anni ‘30, si permise ai partiti comunisti di divenire potentissimi in Italia, chiave del mediterraneo e a cui si doveva impedire di tornare ad avere una politica da protagonista, e in Francia, dove una tradizione di grandeur e di senso dello Stato poteva intaccare quel senso di internazionalismo anti-Stato. Di fatto questa politica riuscì solo in Italia, in cui il PCI e i suoi alleati riuscirono ad abbattere tanto l’auto-sostentamento militare che quello energetico con la battaglia antinucleare e con la guerra ai sostenitori della politica mediterranea e filo-araba (si pensi al delitto Moro, alla guerra a Craxi e alla collusione tanto di dirigenti che di terroristi rossi con lobbies israeliane come Terracini, Bertoli, Israelil rosso”, ecc.).
Gli stessi Usa, paladini della libertà, usarono l’arma del terrore durante l’epoca McCarthy e soffocarono nel sangue i tentativi di liberazione dalla loro influenza dai paesi dell’America Latina.

Di fatto il clima di continua tensione, certamente aiutato dall’impotenza politica dell’Onu che prevedeva diritto di veto tanto dagli Usa che dai sovietici, non fece altro che aiutare i due grandi colossi a reggersi in piedi nel dominio delle rispettive sfere d’influenza. Tensione che i due colossi fecero ben attenzione a non far mai esplodere e far andare fuori controllo, come dimostrano il sospetto assassinio del presidente Kennedy e il contemporaneo improvviso golpe contro il presidente Kruscev, proprio i due uomini politici che rischiarono di dar inizio alla guerra nell’episodio della crisi missilistica di Cuba.

vendredi, 12 décembre 2008

Berlin: nous l'avons tant voulu...

SYNERGIES EUROPÉENNES / PARTISAN EUROPÉEN - DÉCEMBRE 1989

1998561.jpg

 

Un texte totalement dépassé, mais qui montre bien les espoirs fous que nous avons cultivés au moment de la chute du Mur de Berlin ! Des espoirs que le personnel politique européen, incapable et vendu à l'étranger, n'a pas été capable de faire passer dans le réel. A méditer...

 

 

 

Berlin: nous l'avons tant voulu...

 

 

La lente agonie du communisme, la dislocation du système de Yalta, la réunification allemande

 

Le 9 novembre 1989 est déjà une date historique. Une ère nouvelle vient de s'ouvrir. L'Europe redevient une unité de civilisation, un espace unifié mais divers, un réseau d'échanges multiséculaire. La géopolitique allemande disait qu'elle était un Großraum, un grand espace. Gorbat-chev dit qu'elle est une "maison commune". Simple différence de vocabulaire qui désigne une réalité incontournable que les idéologies marxiste et ploutocra-tique a-vaient voulu nier.

 

Nous l'avions toujours dit: l'Europe ne se fera pas à partir du marché commun, ne se construira pas depuis cet Occident sans élan, engoncé dans son corset matérialiste. L'Europe sera à nouveau un Großraum quand la nation qui occupe son cen-tre sera réunifiée. Et le premier grand pas de cette réunification vient d'avoir lieu. Le Mur de la honte, le Mur qui sym-bolisait la défaite de toute l'Europe vient de tomber. Les peuples de l'Est réclament à nouveau leur droit à l'auto-détermina-tion.

 

Pour nous, militants nationaux-révolution-naires, partisans d'une "troisième voie", cet événement majeur annonce le triom-phe discret de certaines de nos idées. Un triomphe discret qui s'avance toutefois sur un chemin semé d'embûches.

 

Dressons le bilan des événements qui nous apparaissent positifs:

 

- L'Allemagne est en marche vers sa réunification. Le peuple allemand est, en Europe, le peuple-passerelle: c'est lui qui nous relie au monde slave, qui nous arrache à nos torpeurs occidentales. Le territoire allemand est aussi un territoire-pas-serelle: c'est lui que nous devons traverser pour atteindre les Balkans, pour débouler à Delphes ou à Athènes, pour re--joindre la Scandinavie, pour aller flâner sur les gondoles de Venise. Sans l'unité de ce territoire, pas d'unité européenne, pas d'échanges fructueux, pas d'autonomie con-tinentale possible.

 

- La vision du monde des chrétiens-dé-mo-crates s'effondre. Ces misérables voyous politiques ne voulaient pas d'une Eu-rope qui contiendrait une majorité de non-catholiques. Pour nous, l'unité des ethnies d'Europe, l'unité du territoire ma--triciel de notre race, prime de loin les ambitions sectaires du Vatican et de ses alliés de la mafia. Avec la réunification al-lemande en marche, l'Allemagne ne con-tient déjà plus une majorité de Catho-li-ques. La CEE avait été créé dans une op-tique de reconquista: avoir une majorité catholique aux Pays-Bas, isoler les Protes-tants du Nord de l'Allemagne et con-traindre les Anglicans à une sorte d'oe-cu-ménisme, tout en maintenant les Ortho-doxes loin de nous. La CEE devait être un espace entièrement sous la coupe du ca-tho-licisme: désormais, ce rêve est à ran-ger parmi les vieilleries...

 

- Le communisme s'effondre. Notre en-nemi le plus musclé et le plus tenace bais-se la garde. Il est vaincu pour des rai-sons aux racines anciennes et profondes: le marxisme avait fait siens, au début du XIXième siècle, les principes mécani-cis-tes et arithmétiques du libéralisme man-chésterien anglais et avait refusé toute lo-gique biologisante, toute philoso-phie de la vie, tout le dynamisme de la physique quan-tique. Une terrible inquisi-tion régnait dans les pays communistes et dans les universités ouest-européennes marxisées contre tous les "irrationalismes" et contre les idées iden-titaires et nationales. Le com-munisme ne s'est pas mis à jour sur le plan scientifique: il a été battu par le libéralisme dans la course aux technolo-gies. Le commu-nisme a nié non pas les faits nationaux en tant que tels mais leur a assigné une place secondaire. Le prin-temps des peuples remet les horloges à l'heure.

 

- Les peuples descendent dans la rue en Moldavie, dans les Pays Baltes, en Alle-magne de l'Est et en Tchécoslovaquie. Ils crient devant leurs dirigeants commu-nistes: "Wir sind das Volk", nous sommes le peuple. De ce fait, ils dénient aux communistes le droit de les représenter et annoncent que les peuples, en tant que volontés historiques, ne peuvent jamais être encadrés de manière rigide. A Pra-gue, les lycéens hurlent "Jakesch à la pou-belle". Cette fantastique mobilisation de la rue devrait nous faire honte: à l'Ouest, nous n'avons plus de tonus, nous sommes tous des chiffes molles bercées par les sonorités soft de nos walkmen. Quand aurons-nous assez de tripes pour vociférer les mêmes slogans, pour insulter collectivement les démocrates-chrétiens, pour cracher aux visages de nos salauds de sociaux-démocrates, pour gifler nos li-béraux, pour rosser nos flics comme plâ-tre, pour bastonner les banquiers qui tien-nent ici le haut du pavé, pour souffle-ter les arrogants détenteurs du quatrième pouvoir, les journaleux à la solde des puis-sances d'argent? A l'Ouest il n'y a plus de peuples, il y a des masses abruties, tenues en laisse par des marchands de gad-gets.

 

Quant aux perspectives négatives, énumé-rons-les aussi:

- Les préliminaires de la réunification profiteront d'abord aux capitalistes ouest-allemands. Ils bénéficient d'ores et déjà de vastes zones de prospection, avec main-d'œuvre à bon marché, où des pro-fits immenses sont possibles. Ces forces ploutocratiques, alliées à leurs consœurs d'Outre-Atlantique, ont un double intérêt: favoriser l'ouverture pour enregistrer des pro-fits colossaux mais conserver suffi-sam-ment de statu quo pour que les tra-vail-leurs de l'Est puissent toujours bosser à bas salaires. L'Europe capitaliste main-tiendra une partie du statu quo, au béné-fice des réseaux marchands et de la puis-sance américaine. Nous, nous voulons l'éli--mination complète du statu quo. Les nationaux-révolu-tionnaires doivent exiger un code du tra-vail valable pour tous les travailleurs euro-péens et un auto-centrage des investisse-ments des plus-values. Plus question d'aller investir des milliards dans un Tiers-Monde à la main-d'œuvre encore meilleure marché. Chaque sou gagné par les travailleurs européens doit être investi en Europe, dans de bonnes infrastruc-tures routières, ferroviaires, scolaires, universitaires. Il faut maximiser les bud-gets de recherche et bâtir chez nous toutes les usines qui peuvent être bâties.

 

- L'effondrement du communisme laisse notre pire adversaire seul sur le ring. Le libéralisme, vieux et malade, triomphe du seul ennemi qui lui restait. Nous avons lutté pour une troisième voie quand les deux antagonistes nous dominaient, tout en s'affrontant. La disparition du commu-nisme nous laisse seuls et mal préparés face au libéralisme. Nous sommes la deu-xième voie, l'autre voie, l'alternative. Beau--coup de travail at-tend les partisans.

 

- L'euphorie des Allemands de l'Est leur fait aimer d'une manière naïve les pro-duc-tions de l'Occident. Combien de jeu-nes Berlinois, le 10 novembre, sont allé s'acheter un baladeur ou un disque de Mi-chael Jackson? Trop à notre goût. Même si la denrée la plus prisée était le fruit exotique. La tâche des militants NR est de montrer à leurs camarades de l'Est quels sont les artifices de l'American Way of Life. Quels affreux simulacres diffuse la société marchande.

 

En conclusion, les cénacles NR d'Europe occidentale, cette poignée de militants hyper-conscients des enjeux   —et dont la force réside précisément dans cette hy-per-conscience—  doivent se réorganiser face aux nouveaux défis qui s'annoncent pour la décennie 1990. Plus d'anti-com-munisme à l'avant-plan; un renforcement de notre anti-américanisme, dans la me-sure où l'impérialisme yankee sera encore dangereux quand les Nippons auront acheté toutes les industries-clefs des Etats-Unis. Il n'y aura plus lieu de faire uniquement de l'"anti-ceci" ou de l'"anti-cela", mais d'ébaucher et de construire la Cité NR, en forgeant un nouveau droit, un nou-veau code social identitaire et socia-liste taillé pour les producteurs. Une ter-rible disci-pline s'impose désormais à l'étu-diant NR, porteur de l'avenir de notre vision du monde et de la société: cesser de perdre son temps à des marottes littéraires et à des problèmes périphéri-ques; cesser de prononcer des discours oiseux sur la grandeur de l'Europe; cesser de dire que l'économie n'est pas le destin (même si c'est très vrai) pour ne pas avoir à réflé-chir sur les statistiques réelles de notre monde. Etre NR, ce n'est pas être un rouspéteur stérile: c'est être un vo-lontaire toujours prêt, la truelle à la main pour construire la Cité nouvelle.

 

Camarades NR de toutes les régions d'Europe, camarades manuels et intellectuels, mobilisez vos muscles et vos cer-veaux, bandez vos énergies, demain nous appartient!

Il domani appartiene a noi!  

 

00:08 Publié dans Histoire | Lien permanent | Commentaires (0) | Tags : allemagne, guerre froide, perestroïka, berlin, mur de berlin | |  del.icio.us | | Digg! Digg |  Facebook

samedi, 29 novembre 2008

Le Sénat tchèque approuve le déploiement d'un radar US

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ABM: le Sénat tchèque approuve le déploiement d’un radar US

Ex: http://fr.altermedia.info

Le Sénat tchèque (chambre haute du parlement) a approuvé jeudi, par 49 voix sur 81, le déploiement d’un radar antimissile américain sur le territoire tchèque.

Les sociaux-démocrates et les communistes ont voté contre le projet, présenté jeudi au Sénat par le premier ministre tchèque Mirek Topolanek.

Washington envisage de déployer en Europe de l’Est des éléments de son bouclier antimissile pour parer à d’éventuelles attaques venant d’Iran ou de Corée du Nord. Les Etats-Unis comptent ainsi installer un radar en République tchèque et dix missiles intercepteurs en Pologne. Moscou, se sentant menacé, a exprimé à plusieurs reprises son hostilité envers ce projet malgré les tentatives américaines visant à rassurer la Russie.

Malgré le feu vert du Sénat, c’est toutefois à la Chambre des députés (chambre basse du parlement) qu’incombe l’essentiel du processus de ratification, qui pourrait se prolonger jusqu’au printemps prochain.

Les projets de déploiement d’une base ABM américaine en République tchèque ont divisé la classe politique en deux camps. A la Chambre des députés, la ratification est soutenue par le Parti démocrate civil au pouvoir dans le pays, mais qui ne bénéficie pas de la majorité au parlement. Une partie des Verts, membres de la coalition dirigeante, s’opposent également au déploiement du radar. Le Parti social démocrate tchèque, principale force d’opposition, votera contre l’installation du radar. Les communistes tchèques se proposent également de voter “contre” et exigent de tenir un référendum sur cette question.

Selon les résultats de sondages d’opinion, les deux tiers de la population de la République tchèque sont hostiles à l’installation du radar ABM américain dans le pays.